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ARTICLES 
FROM TRADEMARKS TO BRANDS 
Deven R. Desai

 
Abstract 
The business world has moved from using trademarks—simple 
symbols identifying products—to brands—rich symbols that feed 
business strategy. At the same time, networked and empowered 
consumers are using brands, brand language, and branding strategies to 
make decisions about what they purchase, express preferences about 
how corporations conduct their business, and call for changes in 
corporate practices. These changes are the future of commerce. But 
trademark law has not kept pace with either. 
This Article argues that because brands are governed by trademark 
law, the full realization of brands as information resources is hindered. 
Current trademark law is blinkered and confused, and consequently fails 
to manage all the interests at stake in the modern business environment. 
This failure flows from a core misunderstanding: trademark law has not 
grasped that it is managing brands, not trademarks. To address this 
shortcoming, this Article develops a new theory of trademarks: brand 
theory. This theory explains riddles within current trademark doctrine 
and provides the foundation for a new normative approach to 
trademarks. It expands the current information-based understanding of 
trademarks to embrace the possibility that trademarks can be true 
information resources for all stakeholders in a brand—corporations, 
consumers, and communities—rather than vessels for only one side’s 
views. In short, a brand theory of trademarks offers the opportunity to 
bring trademark law into the information age. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A Coke is a Coke and no amount of money can get you a better Coke 
than the one the bum on the corner is drinking. All the Cokes are the 
same and all the Cokes are good. Liz Taylor knows it, the president 
knows it, the bum knows it and you know it. 
—Andy Warhol1 
Andy Warhol said that a “Coke is a Coke,” but Coke the brand is 
much more than just a Coke. Warhol was referring to Coke as a 
standardized product that is the same regardless of who buys it. That 
perspective is a trademark way of thinking about Coke. But part of 
                                                                                                                     
 1. Rob Walker, Cult Classic, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 11, 2009, at MM22 (quoting Andy 
Warhol). 
2
Florida Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 4 [2012], Art. 5
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol64/iss4/5
2012] FROM TRADEMARKS TO BRANDS 983 
 
Coke’s power comes from Coke the brand. Coke’s label with the words 
“Coca-Cola” flowing across a red field in white cursive script or Coke’s 
iconic glass bottle are aspects of Coke’s brand. Coke’s brand also has an 
emotional, symbolic component, as the brand evokes a sense of being 
all-American, “Classic,” and the perfect refreshing drink, whether it is 
the Fourth of July or Christmas. A sip of Coke means imbibing an entire 
culture.  
Coke the brand is also much more than just Coke’s brand. When 
Coke tried to deviate from its image and offered New Coke, a Coke 
with a different flavor and corn syrup instead of cane sugar, the public 
spoke up. Consumers wanted the “Real Thing.” They hoarded old 
formula Coke, formed protest groups (with more than 100,000 members 
in some cases), wrote songs about the old taste, and staged 
demonstrations.
2
 As Coke’s official history admits, tests indicated 
people wanted a different flavor but failed to reveal “the bond 
consumers felt with their Coca-Cola—something they didn’t want 
anyone, including The Coca-Cola Company, tampering with.”3 So much 
so that Coke had to offer Coke Classic, which has now simply become 
Coke again with the “Classic” designation dropped. 
Coke’s brand has recently encountered a new problem related to 
Coke from Mexico. In contrast to U.S. Coke, Mexican Coke is still 
made with cane sugar. There is now a growing fanbase for Mexican 
Coke. Some want Coke in the classic glass bottle; some believe the 
flavor is better; some believe cane sugar is healthier.
4
 Consumers search 
online for tips on how to find sources of Mexican Coke and even have a 
Facebook page with more than 10,000 fans.
5
 Coke initially opposed the 
importation.
6
 Yet now Coke has altered course, and one can purchase 
this other Coke in box retail stores alongside U.S. Coke, which Coke 
offers in a resurrected Coke glass bottle, aluminum can, or plastic 
bottle.
7
  
Brands and their relationship to the law have been woefully 
undertheorized. Brands are regulated by trademark law, which fails to 
grasp that trademarks are merely a subset of brands and that it manages 
brands at all. Instead, trademark law champions corporations as the sole 
                                                                                                                     
 2. Coke Lore: The Real Story of New Coke, THE COCA-COLA COMPANY, 
http://www.thecoca-colacompany.com/heritage/cokelore_newcoke.html (last visited Mar. 8, 
2012). 
 3. Id. (emphasis added). 
 4. See Walker, supra note 1. 
 5. Id. 
 6. See Bruce Kennedy, Mexican Coca-Cola Is Finding Sweet Success in the U.S., DAILY 
FIN. (Sept. 20, 2010), http://www.dailyfinance.com/story/company-news/mexican-coca-cola-is-
finding-sweet-success-in-the-u-s/19639897.  
 7. Id. 
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custodians of trademark meaning. As Professor Robert G. Bone 
explains, trademark law’s “core mission, as it is understood today, is to 
facilitate the transmission of accurate information to the market.”8 
Trademark law thus clings to the model of the firm as the one with the 
exclusive power to develop the brand and to control its meaning.
9
  
In addition, trademark law formally relies on the singular idea that 
trademarks are only about economic efficiency.
10
 From this perspective, 
trademarks enhance the economic efficiency of the marketplace by 
“lessen[ing] consumer search costs by making products and producers 
easier to identify in the marketplace,” and “encourag[ing] producers to 
invest in quality by ensuring that they, and not their competitors, reap 
the reputation-related rewards of that investment.”11 In this view, the 
mark becomes a sign of “consistent source and quality.”12  
                                                                                                                     
 8. Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept of Goodwill in 
Trademark Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 547, 548 (2006) (emphasis added). 
 9. In a seminal trademark law article, Professor Ralph Brown argued that protection for 
trade symbols was only proper if such protection served the informational function of trade 
symbols, not any extra persuasive functions. See Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public 
Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1183–84 (1948). Although 
Brown sought to limit trademark protection, this Article argues that by focusing solely on the 
corporate side of information transmission, Brown’s approach failed to account for other 
important sources of information to the marketplace; thus, and perhaps of necessity, it was 
doomed to failure. Cf. Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest in the 
Advertising Age, 108 YALE L.J. 1717, 1734 (1999) (arguing against providing brand producers 
all brand value because of brand value is collectively created). 
 10. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 
30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 265–66 (1987).  
 11. Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. REV. 621, 623 
(2004); accord Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64 (1995) 
(“[T]rademark law . . . ‘reduce[s] the customer’s costs of shopping and making purchasing 
decisions,’ for it quickly and easily assures a potential customer that this item—the item with 
this mark—is made by the same producer as other similarly marked items that he or she liked 
(or disliked) in the past.” (alteration in original) (quoting 1 J. MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON 
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2.01[2], at 2–3 (3d ed. 1994))). 
 12. Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the Rational Basis for 
Trademark Protection, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 789, 790 (1997); cf. Mark A. Lemley & Mark 
McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN. L. REV. 413, 414 (2010). Professors Mark Lemley 
and Mark McKenna further explained this proposition: 
When it works well, trademark law facilitates the workings of modern markets 
by permitting producers to accurately communicate information about the 
quality of their products to buyers, thereby encouraging them to invest in 
making quality products, particularly in circumstances in which that quality 
wouldn’t otherwise be apparent. If competitors can falsely mimic that 
information, they will confuse consumers, who won’t know whether they are in 
fact getting a high quality product. Indeed, some consumers will be stuck with 
lemons. 
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This understanding of the information transmission function 
performed by brands such as Coca-Cola is far too limited. Its premise is 
that the mark holder’s information is the best or only information a 
consumer may desire in assessing a purchase. Yet modern technology 
makes this model obsolete. As the Coke example reveals, consumers do 
not express their market preferences through purchasing decisions 
alone; they also create and share information that contributes 
significantly to the image and meaning of the brand.
13
 Similar examples 
of consumers engaging with and shaping brands are found across a wide 
range of commercial industries—from automotive to beverage, music, 
clothing, cosmetic, and food, among others.
14
 
While trademark law sees trademarks and brands as synonymous,
15
 
brand scholarship and practice recognize that they are not.
16
 Brands 
have many functions. One function maps well to trademark law: the 
corporate provision of information regarding a product to help a 
consumer make a purchase. Trademark law, however, recognizes only 
that function, and in far too limited a way. The corporate dimension of 
branding creates a strategic asset that allows a corporation to forge not 
only a product symbol, but also a connection with consumers so that 
consumers look beyond price when they make a purchasing decision.
17
 
It also enables corporations to sell multiple branded products and 
ancillary merchandise and to turn the brand into a product in its own 
right.
18
  
                                                                                                                     
Id. 
 13. See infra Part III.B. 
 14. See infra Part III.B. 
 15. See, e.g., Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 163–64 (“We cannot find in the basic objectives of 
trademark law any obvious theoretical objection to the use of color alone as a trademark, where 
that color has attained ‘secondary meaning’ and therefore identifies and distinguishes a 
particular brand (and thus indicates its ‘source’). In principle, trademark law, by preventing 
others from copying a source-identifying mark, ‘reduce[s] the customer’s costs of shopping and 
making purchasing decisions.’” (quoting 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 2.01[2], at 23)); see 
also Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 510 (7th Cir. 2002) (“The fundamental purpose of a 
trademark is to reduce consumer search costs by providing a concise and unequivocal identifier 
of the particular source of particular goods. The consumer who knows at a glance whose brand 
he is being asked to buy knows whom to hold responsible if the brand disappoints and whose 
product to buy in the future if the brand pleases. This in turn gives producers an incentive to 
maintain high and uniform quality, since otherwise the investment in their trademark may be 
lost as customers turn away in disappointment from the brand. A successful brand, however, 
creates an incentive in unsuccessful competitors to pass off their inferior brand as the successful 
brand by adopting a confusingly similar trademark, in effect appropriating the goodwill created 
by the producer of the successful brand. The traditional and still central concern of trademark 
law is to provide remedies against this practice.”). 
 16. See infra Parts I.A–B. 
 17. See infra Part I.A.1. 
 18. See infra Part I.A.2. 
5
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The noncorporate dimension of branding involves consumers and 
communities as stakeholders in brands.
19
 Consumers often buy branded 
goods not for their quality but as badges of loyalty, ways to express 
identity, and items to alter and interpret for self-expression.
20
 Some 
consumers form brand communities which either evangelize or police 
brand meaning and corporate practices.
21
 From the perspective of 
trademark law, this behavior presents a problem; from the perspective 
of brand scholarship, it is both ordinary and expected. 
This Article sets forth a new theory of trademarks—one that focuses 
on brands, their functions, and their democratic nature.
22
 This account 
avoids the incoherence and problems that currently plague trademark 
law and scholarship and offers a framework to guide future discussions 
on the purpose, function, and scope of trademark law.  
A brand theory of trademark law explains the current (and 
outmoded) state of this area of law and points the way towards the 
future. The theory offers the most coherent account as to what 
interests—producer or consumer—were at stake in past shifts and 
expansions in trademark protection, and how they were justified. 
Prospectively, when a claim for new protection is made, the theory 
provides tools and vocabulary to recognize precisely what interest is at 
issue and what interests trademark law ought to vindicate, rather than 
relying on broad notions about the relationship between producers and 
consumers and market welfare. As a normative matter, brand theory 
offers a true information-based view of trademarks and a system in 
which both mark holders and consumers are free to share information 
                                                                                                                     
 19. See infra Part I.B. 
 20. See infra Part I.B.1. 
 21. See infra Part I.B.2. 
 22. Thus far, although some trademark scholarship has mentioned brands, no one has 
pointed out that trademark law should focus on brands and all their dimensions rather than 
trademarks. To be clear, this Article owes much to work by Rochelle Dreyfus, Jessica Litman, 
and others who have explained the drive to propertize trademarks, documented the problems 
from such a shift, described some brand behaviors, and argued for greater acknowledgement of 
the role consumers play in constructing trademarks’ meanings. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, 
Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 397 passim (1990) (explaining the way in which consumers use trademarks as valuable 
parts of expression and how trademark law hinders such uses); Litman, supra note 9,  passim 
(tracking changes in advertising practices and trademark law from competition-enhancing 
actions and efforts to persuade consumers to buy products to the provision of complete 
corporate control over trade symbols). These works do not, however, connect brand scholarship 
and practice to the overall structure of trademark law. Thus, this Article follows these 
foundational works as they sought to have trademark law match practice and expand its view to 
understand, accommodate, and protect noncommercial interests. See Dreyfuss, supra, at 398–99. 
In their spirit, this Article hopes to expand the understanding of how brands function and to 
explain why law has come to embrace more than “nondeceptive, informative, and source-
designating functions of trade symbols.” Litman, supra note 9, at 1735. 
6
Florida Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 4 [2012], Art. 5
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol64/iss4/5
2012] FROM TRADEMARKS TO BRANDS 987 
 
about brands without the hindrances the current system imposes. In both 
situations, a brand theory of trademark creates room to be clearer about 
what we are protecting, why we are protecting it, and what we give up 
in protecting one interest over another.  
Part I explains what brands are and how they are different from 
trademarks. Drawing on sociological and marketing scholarship, it 
explains how trademark law has mistakenly equated trademarks with 
brands despite brands being far more complex than trademarks. It then 
offers a taxonomy for understanding the corporate and noncorporate 
dimensions of brands. Part I concludes by showing how brands have 
become the place where the two dimensions complement each other and 
open the door to the co-creation of value by corporate and noncorporate 
stakeholders. 
Part II applies brand theory to core aspects of and specific puzzles 
within trademark doctrine. The general criticism that trademark law has 
expanded well beyond its traditional law and economics foundations 
may be accurate but tells us little. The corporate dimension of brand 
theory, however, explains these issues and shows that trademark law 
has evolved along the corporate dimension of brands while leaving 
important consumer interests behind. 
Part III puts the theory further to the test and offers a brand theory 
critique of trademark law. This approach shows that trademark law 
misunderstands and by design fails to accommodate the noncorporate 
dimension of brands. As but one example, Part III shows that a brand 
approach to the likelihood of confusion test would improve this core 
aspect of trademark law. In addition, it offers a guiding normative 
claim: trademark law should adopt a more open perspective of brands, 
such as the perspective used by marketing and business disciplines. 
Marketing and business disciplines look to a more open, democratic 
understanding of brands precisely because such an approach enhances 
the value of brands and fits with the way brands operate in the 
marketplace. Trademark law ought embrace just such a perspective. 
Furthermore, an open approach creates room for individuals and 
communities to use brands as a locus of personal expression, political 
debate, and market discussion. This approach adheres to an information-
based understanding of trademarks and embraces the possibility that 
they can be true information resources for all sides of the information 
marketplace rather than vessels for only one side’s views. 
7
Resai: From Trademarks to Brands
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2012
988 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64 
 
I.  BRANDS PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 
Trademarks and brands are not the same.
23
 Using marks for the 
“utilitarian provision of information regarding origin and quality in 
order to reduce risk and uncertainty”24 is only a part of what brands 
encompass.
25
 Brands have “more complex . . . characteristics . . . which 
are related to image building and include status/power, inherent value 
and finally, the development of brand personality.”26 As one study puts 
it, marks that only convey information or offer only one part of image 
building are proto-brands.
27
 It is only around the late nineteenth century 
that one sees the birth of modern brands: the use of a private mark to 
provide information regarding source and quality and simultaneously to 
convey image components regarding power, value, and personality.
28
  
Put simply, brands have an array of functions depending on who is 
using the brand and in what context.
29
 A company uses brands to 
                                                                                                                     
 23. Historical work identifies a range of practices for marking goods, including branding, 
as examples of or precursors to the way in which modern trademark functions. See FRANK I. 
SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW RELATING TO TRADE-MARKS 20–21 
(1925) (distinguishing between trademarks and marks designating ownership, and noting the 
importance of these “proprietary marks” in the development of modern trademark law); Sidney 
A. Diamond, The Historical Development of Trademarks, 65 TRADEMARK REP. 265, 266–72 
(1975) (noting that the history of trademarks dates back to the branding of cattle and other 
animals); Daniel M. McClure, Trademarks and Unfair Competition: A Critical History of Legal 
Thought, 69 TRADEMARK REP. 305, 310–16 (1979) (noting that “the earliest use of marks on 
goods dates to antiquity, and were primarily used as an indication of personal ownership”); 
Benjamin G. Paster, Trademarks—Their Early History, 59 TRADEMARK REP. 551, 551–52 
(1969) (discussing the use of marks as a method for distinguishing a maker’s product from 
others); Edward S. Rogers, Some Historical Matter Concerning Trade-Marks, 9 MICH. L. REV. 
29, 29–30 (1910) (dating the usage of trademarks back to “the very earliest times,” where marks 
were used for identification purposes). In early eras, brands were burned or carved marks 
indicating ownership, slave, or criminal status. See Deven R. Desai & Spencer Waller, Brands, 
Competition, and the Law, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1425, 1432 (“Although many different ancient 
and medieval civilizations—from the Indus river valley to China to several Mediterranean 
cultures to Nigeria to the Arab Empire to medieval England—used brands and a variety of other 
commercial symbols to indicate ownership and facilitate commerce[,] none of those uses 
corresponds to modern brands.”); Diamond, supra, at 266–67, 273, 283–85.  
 24. Karl Moore & Susan Reid, The Birth of the Brand: 4,000 Years of Branding History 5, 
25 (MPRA, Working Paper No. 10169, 2008), available at http://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/10169/ (examining branding practices from 2250 BCE to 300 BCE). 
 25. See, e.g., Susan Fournier, Consumers and Their Brands: Developing Relationship 
Theory in Consumer Research, 24 J. CONSUMER RES. 343, 344 (1998) (challenging the way in 
which brand theory often reduces to utilitarian views).  
 26. Moore & Reid, supra note 24, at 25. 
 27. Id. at 26. 
 28. Id. at 24, 26. 
 29. Some may want or prefer a definition of a brand. Although understandable, this 
Article argues that because a brand has several, simultaneous functions depending on contexts 
and operates within information and network rules, a taxonomy of brands is more useful than a 
 
8
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provide product information to consumers, but it also uses brands to 
enhance the overall corporate image as the company pursues a full 
range of business goals. Consumers may, of course, use brands to find 
products. But consumers may simultaneously use brands as expressions 
of individuality and identity as they take a brand and alter it to match 
what they see as the meaning of the brand and how that meaning relates 
to their self-image or message. Communities may also engage with a 
brand as a symbol about which they wish to comment and share both 
positive and negative information. 
Some simple examples illustrate how brands have utilitarian and 
non-utilitarian dimensions. Consider the brands McDonald’s, Nike, 
Apple, and Gucci. At one level, they all help consumers sort products. 
One can buy a Big Mac in New York, Los Angeles, or anywhere in the 
United States, and it will be the same. Nike, Apple, and Gucci offer a 
similar, but not quite the same, proposition. One can buy a shoe, 
electronic device, or item of clothing, but often none of them will be 
exactly the same as a previously purchased shoe, device, or outfit. A 
line may have been altered or discontinued. Instead of relying on the 
item to remain the same, the consumer relies on the symbol for 
assurance that the product will live up to her expectations.  
The Nike shoe will essentially be the same as the shoe one bought 
previously; it will provide support, decay after a certain number of uses, 
and so on. Other Nike products will likely, but not definitely, be well-
suited for the various athletic activities at which they are aimed. Apple 
devices will be elegant, have an easy interface, start up and shut down 
quickly, and be stable. Gucci apparel will have a certain attention to 
detail, use high-end fabric, and fit within Gucci style, which Gucci will 
define over time. In these cases, brands relate to the company as a 
source for a host of goods with somewhat consistent qualities.  
If a competitor used those same marks on goods, the consumer 
might be quite upset. She can no longer rely on the mark to indicate 
source and quality. As consumers are forced to engage in new searches, 
their sense of trust in the mark diminishes. The law prevents such acts 
in the name of protecting the consumer from increased search costs and 
protecting the producer’s goodwill. That is, the law claims to protect the 
producer’s investment in making and offering a product that consumers 
                                                                                                                     
reductive definition. Cf. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U.  
CHI. L. REV. 919, 983 n.237 (“[S]ocial networks analysis is often context-dependent in ways that 
defy easy characterization or simplistic modeling. The ‘rules’ of social network theory (for 
example, the strength of weak ties, the tendency for social networks to be scale-free, the 
tendency of information of information to degrade as it passes through a social network) 
necessarily operate at a medium to high level of generality.”).   
9
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wish to purchase from that producer because the producer is offering a 
product with known quality.  
Yet some authorized merchandise, such as keychains, are low-end 
products and often are not held to the same standard as the main 
products with, for example, the Apple logo on them. Companies 
sometimes offer lower-end goods as a way to expand their market, 
foster good feelings toward the company’s core products, or maintain a 
relationship with consumers who want to engage with the brand but not 
the company’s high-cost products.30  
Even when a company does not authorize the production of such 
merchandise, a consumer may buy unauthorized, branded goods 
knowing full well that the company does not sanction them.
31
 People 
buy clothes, flags, beer cozies, mobile phone shells, and almost any 
merchandise one can imagine with a favorite sports team logo, comic 
book character, or other cultural symbol regardless of whether the team 
or entertainment company authorized the item’s manufacture. In these 
situations, people are simply not confused.  
Many companies encourage consumers to see a brand as having a 
personality and to accept the idea that owning a branded good connects 
the consumer to the brand in some deep, personal way.
32
 Buying 
                                                                                                                     
 30. Cf. Litman, supra note 9, at 1726–27 (explaining that marketing is a value on its own 
and that some find a box of cereal with Batman on it different than one without). 
 31. See, e.g., Ingrida Karins Berzins, Comment, The Emerging Circuit Split over 
Secondary Meaning in Trade Dress Law, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1661, 1661 (2004) (“Big-city 
sidewalk vendors have long hawked ‘Rolex’ watches and ‘Donna Karan’ t-shirts. In an upscale 
twist on the theme, the Wall Street Journal recently reported that ‘purse parties,’ in which 
hostesses sell knockoff designer goods to their friends, are a hot new trend, albeit with the 
potential downside of jail time.”); cf. Dreyfuss, supra note 22, at 407 (explaining the idea of 
surplus value and issues regarding whether the mark holder or another manufacturer should get 
that value). For a discussion of how intellectual property law in general may be seen as a 
reaction to “increasingly powerful copying technologies [that] threaten quickly to dilute the 
rarity and thus the distinctiveness of otherwise distinctive goods,” see Barton Beebe, Intellectual 
Property Law and the Sumptuary Code, 123 HARV. L. REV. 809, 815 (2010).  
 32. See WILLIAM J. MCEWEN, MARRIED TO THE BRAND: WHY CONSUMERS BOND WITH 
SOME BRANDS FOR LIFE 32–33 (2005). William J. McEwen lists five ways a brand can have 
personal meaning: as a sign of prestige (for example, the status of wearing a Rolex watch), 
personal quality (for example, youth for Pepsi or competitive excellence in Nike), membership 
(for example, the club-like aspect of owning a Harley-Davidson motorcycle), memory triggers 
(for example, associating a food brand with family tradition), and self-completion (for example, 
brands that consumers see as signs of self-completion, such as Marlboro as a sign of being a 
rugged man or L’Oreal as a sign of being worth spending extra for oneself). See id. at 36–38; 
see also MICHAEL J. SILVERSTEIN & NEIL FISKE, TRADING UP: WHY CONSUMERS WANT NEW 
LUXURY GOODS—AND HOW COMPANIES CREATE THEM 34–35, 41, 48 (2005) (discussing the 
emotional outcomes of branding as well as the feeling of individualization). For an excellent 
account of how Nike built its brand, see generally DONALD KATZ, JUST DO IT: THE NIKE SPIRIT 
IN THE CORPORATE WORLD (1994).  
10
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branded goods, authorized or not, is one way in which consumers build 
that connection. Given the mystique behind McDonald’s, Apple, Nike, 
Gucci, and other powerful brands, the consumer is buying the brand 
itself.
33
  
Taken further, a consumer may use a brand to express herself. The 
brand is a symbol not for the producer, but for the consumer; she either 
embraces the brand’s offered image as an outward sign of personality or 
criticizes the brand image.
34
 In some cases, a community may form 
around a brand. The group will use the brand as the center of activity 
that celebrates or passes judgment on the brand, depending on how the 
group perceives the company’s ability to remain true to either the 
company’s claimed vision of the brand or the group’s understanding of 
the true meaning of the brand.
35
 
Brand scholarship is not, however, directly aimed at the law. For 
that literature to be useful for legal discussions, a synthesis is required. 
The remainder of Part I develops a taxonomy of brand functions 
                                                                                                                     
 33. See Graeme W. Austin, Trademarks and the Burdened Imagination, 69 BROOK. L. 
REV. 827, 849 (2004) (“Consumers often value trademarks for their own sake, and the incessant 
promotion of brands blurs the dividing line between the trademark and the goods themselves.”). 
 34. Id.; see also Dreyfuss, supra note 22, at 413–14 (noting language’s malleability and 
the way in which meaning is shaped by interactions specific to speakers’ and listeners’ actions 
to open a path to a “new level of understanding”). 
 35. See, e.g., MCEWEN, supra note 32, at 37, 89–90: 
As a regional brewer, Coors had an intensely loyal following bonded to and 
very proud of the brand because of its unique, Colorado- and Rocky-
Mountains-only availability and image. However, as Coors expanded to 
maximize its volume potential, it also lost a good deal of the Colorado panache 
that had cemented its original customers to what they saw as a unique, personal 
brand experience that was not readily available to or intended for all. 
Whether such communities form around brands with less obvious community dimensions, such 
as Post-it or Bic pens, remains to be seen. Nonetheless, Post-it has a Facebook page and seems 
to desire that some level of brand community emerge, which is to be expected from a brand 
approach to its trademark. See Post-It, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/postit (last visited 
Mar. 8, 2012). I thank Barton Beebe for raising this point. In addition, the consumer and 
community aspects of branding might be understood as a type of recoding problem. See Justin 
Hughes, “Recoding” Intellectual Property and Overlooked Audience Interests, 77 TEX. L. REV. 
923, 926–27 (1999) (noting the tensions between users of intellectual property who wish to use 
and “recode” a given intellectual property and the desire for other users to have the intellectual 
property remain stable). In trademark law, the problem can be that one group wishes to maintain 
the stability of a mark’s meaning as the group sees it, but that vision may conflict with the 
stability we may want for the mark as it operates in the marketplace. Id. at 1006–07. The general 
problem of recoding and reinterpreting a mark while maintaining a viable trademark system is a 
core question in trademark law. A fuller explanation of the way that understanding brands as 
information devices can allow for both recoding and stability for the trademark system is 
beyond the scope of this Article but is addressed in part in my forthcoming scholarship. See 
Deven R. Desai, An Information Approach to Trademarks, GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2012). 
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designed for trademark law. Brand scholarship can be split into two 
major dimensions. One, the corporate dimension, sees the brand as 
owned and controlled by the corporation and shaped by the marketer. 
The other, the noncorporate dimension, accepts that brands are social 
constructs driven by individuals at a personal level and communities at 
a social level. The next two sections identify the four major types of 
modern brands and explore what brand scholarship has to say about 
their roles. Although the corporate and noncorporate dimensions serve 
useful descriptive, organizational, and analytical functions, they do not 
connect to each other. To address this gap, this Part concludes by 
examining recent business, marketing, and brand scholarship regarding 
the way in which companies and consumers co-create value. It argues 
that a new perspective of brands, a networked one, is emerging and 
bridges the apparent divide between corporate and noncorporate views 
of brands. 
A.  The Corporate Side of Brands 
This Section explains how different views of the corporate aspects 
of a brand have evolved in brand scholarship. A brand is first created by 
a firm, often a corporation. Yet the corporation needs to connect to 
something. Thus, a brand begins when it is connected to a product or 
service—a product brand. Once that connection is made, the brand may 
take on additional significance for the corporation. The brand may then 
become an umbrella for all corporate offerings—a corporate brand. 
Together, the product and corporate brands can be understood as falling 
within the corporate side of brands.  
1.  Product Brands 
Marking a single product for commerce is the simplest form of 
branding.
36
 A manufacturer marks a product with a symbol that 
indicates something to the world. Although this idea seems almost 
                                                                                                                     
 36. For simplicity, this Article, like trademark law, draws little distinction between 
trademarks and service marks. See, e.g., Paul M. Schoenhard, Why Marks Have Power Beyond 
the Rights Conferred: The Conflation of Trademarks and Service Marks, 87 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 970, 972 (2005) (“By statute, the definitions of ‘service mark’ and 
‘trademark’ differ only in the substitution of the term ‘services’ for the term ‘goods.’”). 
Although service trademarks apply to goods and service marks “identify and distinguish the 
source and quality of an intangible service,” for the purposes of this stage of the Article, the 
important point is that one understand the idea of a company offering a single good or service. 3 
J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 19:81 (4th 
ed. 2011).  
12
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commonplace today, the practice only began in the 1800s.
37
 One of the 
first examples of product branding occurred when Harley Procter 
renamed his White Soap, Ivory Soap.
38
 By changing his formerly 
generic name for a generic product, Procter created a unique product. In 
general, “[b]y simply labeling products in grocery, dry goods, and 
department stores with descriptive or colorful names, manufacturers 
soon found that sales of the products increased significantly.”39 This 
practice continued across almost all industries and created important 
changes in the way commerce was conducted.
40
 Both brand and 
trademark theory explain product branding as playing an important role; 
product branding for the producer and the consumer. Nonetheless, both 
assume that the producers are active creators of the brand, whereas 
consumers are passive recipients.
41
  
Brand management theory began with an economic approach that 
mirrors the law’s approach to trademarks. The theory built on 
“neoclassical economics and classical marketing theory” to understand 
how a company’s marketing mix—the “4 Ps” of product, place, price, 
and promotion—drove consumer behavior.42 This model sees the brand 
as fully controlled and owned by the company and sees consumers as 
those who take in and process information as they decide whether to 
purchase a good or service.
43
 Brand holders push information regarding 
an offering’s price and quality to consumers, and holders must find 
ways to reduce search costs lest consumers purchase a product based on 
inaccurate information.
44
 The brand becomes the device that allows a 
manufacturer to exploit the “4 Ps.” Companies use advertising to inform 
consumers about the target product and to encourage them to purchase 
it,
45
 and when consumers are ready to buy, they encounter the target 
product at the right price.  
                                                                                                                     
 37. See MARCEL DANESI, BRANDS 13 (2006); Paul Duguid, Developing the Brand: The 
Case of Alcohol, 1800–1880, 4 ENTERPRISE & SOC’Y 405 (2003) (examining brand practices 
from early in the nineteenth century). 
 38. DANESI, supra note 37, at 13. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 13–14. 
 41. See Hope Jensen Schau et al., How Brand Community Practices Create Value, 73 J. 
MARKETING 30, 30 (2009) (“Modern marketing logic, as derived from economics, advanced a 
view of the firm and the customer as separate and discrete; the customer is exogenous to the 
firm and is the passive recipient of the firm’s active value creation efforts . . . .”).  
 42. TILDE HEDING ET AL., BRAND MANAGEMENT: RESEARCH, THEORY AND PRACTICE 30 
(2009) (citing Neil Borden’s work on the marketing mix and E. Jerome McCarthy’s 
development of the “4 Ps” framework as key ideas behind brand management’s adoption of the 
economic approach to branding).  
 43. Id. at 31. 
 44. Id. at 32–33; accord Landes & Posner, supra note 10, at 269–70. 
 45. CELIA LURY, BRANDS: THE LOGOS OF THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 23–24 (2004). 
13
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Yet modern brand scholarship acknowledges a flaw in the economic 
approach and criticizes the approach for being focused on short-term, 
isolated transactions rather than establishing a long-term connection 
with the consumer.
46
 In other words, if a brand only conveys market 
information, the company is offering a new exchange each time a 
consumer chooses to buy goods. A pure view of the brand as an 
information resource for the consumer does not necessarily lead to 
repeat purchases; it merely allows for faster information processing. In 
addition, the view must assume that the consumer is a fully rational 
maximizer who does not buy goods for “hedonic” purposes, such as 
“emotional and irrational wants and desires.”47 
Product branding touches on an important, yet small, part of what a 
brand does. Some products, such as a bar of soap or a bottle of soda, 
remain relatively stable. Many products, however, change quickly. In 
addition, companies usually offer more than one product and may 
discontinue product lines. This reality points to the next category of 
brands: the corporate brand. 
2.  Corporate Brands 
Once companies saw the advantages of branding, they quickly 
began to brand the company itself. For example, the Parker Company 
sold a range of fountain pens that were all “Parker pens.”48 Many of 
today’s most powerful companies, such as Coca-Cola, Kodak, Heinz, 
Gillette, Kraft, Johnson & Johnson, Ford, Tiffany, and Wrigley’s, as 
well as more than fifty other major brands, started around 1900.
49
 These 
companies were not selling just one product. They leveraged their 
existing product position and offered new products to consumers.
50
 
The shift is subtle, but central, to understanding brands. The 
company, not a specific product, is the brand.
51
 Direct competition was 
no longer the issue. Instead, companies with established brand names in 
one sector of the economy sought to prevent companies in other sectors 
from marking unrelated products with the established brand name.
52
  
                                                                                                                     
 46. HEDING ET AL., supra note 42, at 34.  
 47. Id. at 33; accord LURY, supra note 45, at 5–6.  
 48. DANESI, supra note 37, at 13. 
 49. See RONALD HAMBLETON, THE BRANDING OF AMERICA 61, 64–65, 90, 172–74, 182–83, 
209–11 (1987); LURY, supra note 45, at 101. 
 50. See HAMBLETON, supra note 49, at 91–93, 172, 183, 210–11. 
 51. See HEDING ET AL., supra note 42, at 51; LURY, supra note 45, at 32. 
 52. See Bone, supra note 8, at 595–96 (describing how the U.S. Supreme Court dealt with 
the problem); accord Sara Stadler Nelson, The Wages of Ubiquity in Trademark Law, 88 IOWA 
L. REV. 731, 759–60 (2003) (examining how the court in Tiffany & Co. v. Tiffany Products, Inc., 
264 N.Y.S. 459 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1932), quoted and incorporated Schechter’s ideas and opened the 
door to dilution rationales in confusion cases). 
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In this model, the corporate brand sits on top of the product brand. 
Insofar as one claims that the corporate brand reduces search costs, it 
does so only in a thin way. One relies on the brand to indicate that a 
new product will be high quality, even if that product is something the 
company has not made before. Or at the extreme, one may rely on the 
brand when the company is entering a market in which the company has 
never been before.
53
  
Current brand scholarship takes three different approaches to 
corporate branding. In each, the corporation drives the process of 
creating the brand and using information to manage the brand. These 
views of corporate branding begin to acknowledge that consumers are a 
key part of the branding process; but at their core, they still relegate 
consumers to the status of secondary actors who are inert or, at best, 
merely process information fed to them.  
The identity approach to corporate branding seeks to control the 
way consumers experience the company at every level through “the 
creation of a unified, visual and behavioral identity.”54 The corporation 
seeks to align internal factors and external factors to offer the full brand 
identity to all stakeholders: top management, employees, consumers, 
and the media.
55
 Management continually offers its piece of the brand 
and then incorporates feedback information to fine-tune the alignment 
between internal and external factors that make up brand identity.
56
 For 
                                                                                                                     
 53. Cf. Mark P. McKenna, Testing Modern Trademark Law’s Theory of Harm, 95 IOWA 
L. REV. 63, 117 (2009) (arguing that producer interests such as market entry may be what 
trademark addresses rather than consumer interests). 
 54. HEDING ET AL., supra note 42, at 49; cf. LURY, supra note 45, at 27 (describing the 
way in which Levi’s, Persil, Mars, Smirnoff, and Versace maintained a consistent brand image, 
which allowed them to extend the brand into new product offerings). 
 55. HEDING ET AL., supra note 42, at 56–59. For example, according to Professor Celia 
Lury, brands allowed companies to move beyond the “4 Ps” of product, price, place, promotion, 
which a competitor could duplicate, to a fifth P, personality of a company, which competitors 
could not copy. LURY, supra note 45, at 33–34. Although Lury calls this shift “personality,” it 
maps to the corporate identity view. Lury defines her version of personality as being built and 
reflected by the internal connection between the brand and employees who become “the soul” of 
the brand. Id.; cf. DANESI, supra note 37, at 33 (explaining brands as personalities with 
identities). 
 56. See Mary Jo Hatch & Majken Schultz, Relations Between Organizational Culture, 
Identity and Image, 31 EUR. J. MARKETING 356, 359, 361 (1997) (describing the interaction 
between internal and external information about corporate identity as managers “orchestrate 
deliberate attempts to influence public impression”); see also Curtis P. Haugtvedt et al., 
Cognitive Strength of Established Brands: Memory, Attitudinal, and Structural Approaches, in 
BRAND EQUITY & ADVERTISING: ADVERTISING’S ROLE IN BUILDING STRONG BRANDS 247–48 
(David A. Aaker & Alexander L. Biel eds., 1993) (discussing the need for the creation of “brand 
memories”); accord HEDING ET AL., supra note 42, at 70; cf. DOUGLAS B. HOLT, HOW BRANDS 
BECOME ICONS: THE PRINCIPLES OF CULTURAL BRANDING 15–16, 215 (2004) (arguing that brand 
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example, by developing and refining product design, companies can 
overcome “the lack of obvious differences between products.”57 But this 
strategy is part of the larger strategic goal, one that sees management as 
gathering information from stakeholders while it controls all the ways in 
which the brand is communicated.
58
 
A related corporate branding approach, the (somewhat ironically 
named) consumer-based approach, focuses on how a brand exists from 
the individual consumer’s view as a cognitive construct and then asks 
how management can shape that perception.
59
 The consumer-based 
approach presents a paradox. On one hand, the approach views the 
consumer as the owner of the brand.
60
 On the other hand, because the 
approach draws on cognitive psychology and the idea that the 
information put into a system will generate specific outputs, it seeks to 
map how a consumer understands the brand with the belief that offering 
“exactly the right brand elements” will generate a desired response.61  
These two views intersect and require that management begin by 
gathering data from and about consumers to understand the consumer 
perspective accurately. Management then generates brand 
communication based on that understanding. The brand communication 
seeks to ensure that consumers know the brand; thus, management must 
choose the correct brand elements to ensure that consumers are aware of 
the brand.
62
 This approach is premised on a concept called brand 
awareness: the idea that consumers will remember a brand and purchase 
a product for reasons beyond the functional aspects of a product and 
even possibly pay a higher price for a good regardless of quality.
63
 
                                                                                                                     
identity is part of a general “mind share” approach to branding where a company constructs a 
timeless brand and then tries to capture part of a consumer’s mind with that image). 
 57. LIZ MOOR, THE RISE OF BRANDS 27–28 (2007); see also DANESI, supra note 37, at 60–
67 (detailing the importance of product and package design through the examples of the 
automobile, perfume, and tobacco industries). 
 58. See LURY, supra note 45, at 20–23; MOOR, supra note 57, at 30–33.  
 59. See Kevin Lane Keller, Conceptualizing, Measuring, and Managing Customer-Based 
Brand Equity, 57 J. MARKETING 1, 2 (1993). 
 60. HEDING ET AL., supra note 42, at 85. 
 61. Id. at 86; see also Keller, supra note 59, at 9–12 (describing possible strategic actions 
to increase brand equity under the consumer-based theory of brand management). 
 62. LURY, supra note 45, at 79 (explaining brand awareness, the amount of consumers 
that know that a brand exists, as a key component to brand equity as defined by Keller); accord 
HEDING ET AL., supra note 42, at 102–03 (“It is all about making the brand known to consumers, 
making consumers pay attention to the brand by choosing the right brand elements.”). 
 63. Keller, supra note 59, at 8–9 (“Fundamentally, high levels of brand awareness and a 
positive brand image should increase the probability of brand choice, as well as produce greater 
consumer (and retailer) loyalty and decrease vulnerability to competitive marketing actions. 
Thus, the view of brand loyalty adopted here is that it occurs when favorable beliefs and 
attitudes for the brand are manifested in repeat buying behavior. Some of these beliefs may 
reflect the objective reality of the product, in which case no underlying customer-based brand 
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To achieve brand awareness, management must make sure that 
consumers pay attention to the brand.
64
 By analyzing consumer data, 
management can assess which aspects of a brand have positive, neutral, 
and negative effects and craft a strategy for future brand activity. 
Because consumers face a barrage of similar information about 
competing brands, management seeks to craft a consistent and often 
repeated brand message that resonates with consumers and carves out 
lasting mental associations; in that sense brand awareness is high.
65
  
A third major approach to brand theory, the personality approach, 
rounds out corporate branding. The personality approach focuses on the 
ways in which consumers ascribe personalities to brands
66
 and holds 
that “consumers’ need for identity and expression of self is a key driver 
of the consumption of a brand.”67 With this understanding, companies 
create “system[s] that . . . link brand names to broader values and 
meanings . . . .”68  
In this personality-driven system, products have “essences” that 
meet consumers’ psychological needs and lifestyle goals.69 Consumers 
use brands to define themselves on a personal level so that they may 
have an idea about who they are while aspiring to a different way of 
being.
70
 In addition, a given consumer may use a brand or brands to 
                                                                                                                     
equity may be present, but in other cases they may reflect favorable, strong, and unique 
associations that go beyond the objective reality of the product.”); accord HEDING ET AL., supra 
note 42, at 104 (noting that under the consumer-based approach, consumers may “be willing to 
pay a premium price and accept lower-quality goods for the same brand if it is a brand with high 
awareness”). 
 64. Curtis Haugtvedt et al., supra note 56, at 247–48 (raising suggestions for achieving 
brand awareness); H. Shanker Krishnan & Dipankar Chakravarti, Varieties of Brand Memory 
Induced by Advertising: Determinants, Measures, and Relationships, in BRAND EQUITY AND 
ADVERTISING: ADVERTISING’S ROLE IN BUILDING STRONG BRANDS 213, 215–16 (David A. Aaker 
& Alexander L. Biel eds., 1993) (detailing the way in which ads may grab the consumer’s 
attention); accord HEDING ET AL., supra note 42, at 104 (detailing the importance of repeat 
exposure to commercial messaging). But see Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: 
Trademark Law and Cognitive Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 507, 511 (2008) (questioning the 
validity of the cognitive science claims regarding how brands are stored in a consumer’s mind). 
 65. HOLT, supra note 56, at 15–16. 
 66. One of the foundational articles in this field is Professor Jennifer Aaker’s Dimensions 
of Brand Personality, 34 J. MARKETING RES. 347, 347 (1997), which examines the general idea 
that consumers imbue brands with human personalities and offers a systematic way to assess 
what those personalities are for a given brand.  
 67. HEDING ET AL., supra note 42, at 117. 
 68. MOOR, supra note 57, at 23. 
 69. See LURY, supra note 45, at 24–25; cf. DANESI, supra note 37, at 8, 16 (describing 
how advertising aims to persuade a consumer that a product will fulfill “emotional, social, and 
other kinds of human needs”). 
 70. Karl Moore and Susan Reid describe the growth of the brand as a company creating a 
personality for a brand which a consumer then incorporates into how that consumer “express[es] 
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signal where he may fit into the social world.
71
 When a brand matches 
either of these aspects of the consumer’s view of himself, the resulting 
congruence drives the consumer to purchase items bearing the brand.
72
 
Accordingly, management seeks to understand how consumers use 
brands in fashioning their identities and to offer brands with 
characteristics that match consumers’ needs.73  
All three approaches to branding—identity, consumer, and 
personality—view the company brand, not the product brand, as the 
central matter.
74
 As Richard Branson—master of branding and CEO of 
Virgin—has put it, companies “build brands not around products but 
around reputation.”75 The identity approach seeks to control and shape 
                                                                                                                     
his or her own self, an ideal self, or specific dimensions of the self.” Moore & Reid, supra note 
24, at 24 (citations omitted); accord DANESI, supra note 37, at 33 (describing how the 
personalities of the brands merge with those of the consumers). 
 71. See HEDING ET AL., supra note 42, at 124. 
 72. Joseph T. Plummer, How Personality Makes a Difference, 40 J. ADVERTISING RES., 
Nov.–Dec. 2000, at 79, 81 (explaining how a consumer will favor a brand that has a personality 
in which the consumer sees himself); accord HEDING ET AL., supra note 42, at 124–25 
(describing the “self-expressive value” of branding); cf. Aaker, supra note 66, at 355 (noting 
congruence problems between brand and human personalities). See generally CLOTAIRE 
RAPAILLE, THE CULTURE CODE 5–9 (2006) (arguing that different cultures have codes that 
resonate with consumers and that companies’ brands must be congruent with those codes in 
order to be successful).  
 73. See HEDING ET AL., supra note 42, at 138. 
 74. An irony here is that in some cases a corporate brand will fall into the background. 
There can be three levels at work: the corporate brand, the immediate brand, and the product. 
Consider as examples: General Motors, Chevrolet, Corvette; Procter and Gamble, Crest, Crest 
Whitestrips; Disney, Muppets, Cookie Monster. There is a community for whom the brand 
Corvette is more the central matter than the parent corporate brand GM, and so on. I thank 
Professor Justin Hughes for pointing out this argument and these examples. 
I would agree with Professor Hughes and go further to say that the products themselves, 
such as Cookie Monster and perhaps even Crest Whitestrips, are central matters for some. Yet, 
car enthusiasts are quite aware of the parent brand when comparing Chevy and Ford. With 
Disney and the Muppets, Disney purchased the brand, but the rights to Muppets from Sesame 
Street remain with the Sesame Workshop. See  Jonathan Berr, Disney’s Muppets Purchase May 
Finally Pay off with New Film, DAILYFINANCE.COM (Nov. 10, 2011, 6:00 AM), 
http://www.dailyfinance.com/2011/11/10/disneys-muppets-purchase-may-finally-pay-off-with-
new-film/. How much Disney wishes to clarify its relationship with the Muppets of any type is 
up to Disney. After all, this is the company that launched Touchstone Pictures to isolate its 
brand from non-PG-rated movie fare. See Rod Gustafson, Is Disney Sailing into Rough Waters?, 
PARENTPREVIEWS.COM (July 11, 2003), http://parentpreviews.com/the-big-picture/post/is-
disney-sailing-into-rough-waters. 
Corporate branding as described here reveals that different companies may use different 
corporate structures and related brand-strategies either to offer the cohesive overview the 
theories indicate or to try and isolate a brand. Even an isolated brand can be analyzed with the 
taxonomy. And one must analyze which approach is at work if one is to assess whether any 
claims—about mark holder rights, a corporate source behind the product, an anonymous source 
that matters, or goodwill—make sense, and if so, to what degree. 
 75. LURY, supra note 45, at 121–22 (quoting Richard Branson’s explanation of branding) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  
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that reputation in every context. The consumer-based approach seeks to 
understand how consumers conceptualize a brand and manipulate that 
process so that the consumer has a positive view of the brand. The 
personality approach seeks to offer brands that match consumers’ 
psychological needs so that they purchase the company-branded product 
for its symbolic value.  
In other words, if a company brands itself and manages its brand 
well, it can move beyond the “4 Ps”—which a competitor could 
duplicate—to a new dimension, one that cannot be copied.76 Marketing 
strategy, advertising, and even packaging are all part of the brand 
strategy used to communicate information and values. This brand 
strategy encourages consumers to buy one company’s product over a 
competitor’s for reasons other than the price or quality of the good.77 
Furthermore, once a company has created such a brand, the 
company can offer diffusion products. Rather than having one good at a 
particular price point, a company can offer a range of goods at different 
prices and market points to give a variety of people “access to the 
brand.”78 In sum, the corporate brand is the lever by which a company 
grabs consumers and enters markets.
79
 The brand is the symbol and tool 
of the company, not simply a specific product or even a series of 
products.
80
 
B.  The Noncorporate Side of Brands 
This Section explains how noncorporate actors can shape a brand. 
Although a brand begins with a corporation, it can quickly move 
beyond corporate control. Once the brand is offered to the world, 
consumers and communities may engage with and sometimes 
reinterpret or repurpose the brand. Not all brands will have consumer 
and community meanings.
81
 But when they do, consumers and 
communities have the potential to alter the brand meaning the 
                                                                                                                     
 76. See LURY, supra note 45, at 24, 33–34; cf. DANESI, supra note 37, at 33 (explaining 
brands as personalities with identities). 
 77. See MOOR, supra note 57, at 18–21; cf. Erich Joachimsthaler & David A. Aaker, 
Building Brands Without Mass Media, 75 HARV. BUS. REV. 39 (1997) (stating that “mass-media 
advertising has long been the cornerstone of most brand-building efforts”). 
 78. LURY, supra note 45, at 61–62. 
 79. Cf. McKenna, supra note 53, at 117 (discussing market entry as a potential theory of 
harm for trademark holders). 
 80. Lury presents another way to understand this strategy in that brands enable companies 
to move beyond the “4 Ps,” which a competitor could duplicate to include a fifth P, personality 
of a company, which competitors could not copy. See supra note 55. 
 81. Indeed, whether, how much, and how many consumers and communities choose to 
engage with a given brand will vary from brand to brand. 
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corporation intended. Consumers and communities also open the 
potential opportunity to inform and enhance a brand’s overall value.  
1.  Consumer Brands 
Brand scholarship underwent a significant change in the mid-
1990s.
82
 It shifted from a positivistic paradigm where the company 
owns the brand and pushes information to the consumer to a 
constructivist or interpretive paradigm that “reflects on the nature of the 
brand and the value of brand equity as something created in the 
interaction between marketer and an active consumer.”83 Under the 
constructivist or interpretive paradigm, the consumer has an active part 
in the construction and strength of the brand.  
The first major constructivist approach to branding is the relational 
approach. Unlike previous approaches, it applies “an entirely qualitative 
research design, and focus[es] on meaning instead of information.”84 In 
addition, it understands brands as part of a dyadic system where 
consumers are on an equal footing with the brand, and consumer and 
brand exchange with each other equally.
85
 This approach implicitly 
casts the brand as something partly owned by the consumer. It abandons 
the input–output relationship at the heart of approaches which look to 
the company as the owner of the brand.
86
  
Like the personality approach, relational brand theory accepts that 
people imbue brands with human characteristics.
87
 Relational brand 
theory, however, goes further: “For the brand to serve as a legitimate 
relationship partner, it must surpass the personification qualification and 
actually behave as an active, contributing member of the dyad.”88 A 
company’s intention for what a brand is or what it means does not, and 
arguably cannot, capture the way in which consumers take a brand and 
                                                                                                                     
 82. See HEDING ET AL., supra note 42, at 22–24. 
 83. Id. at 21; see also Fournier, supra note 25, at 344 (stating that “relationships involve 
reciprocal exchange between active and interdependent relationship partners”). 
 84. See HEDING ET AL., supra note 42, at 153. 
 85. See id. at 154; Fournier, supra note 25, at 344; Susan Fournier, A Meaning-Based 
Framework for the Study of Consumer-Object Relations, 18 ADVANCES CONSUMER RES. 736, 
740 (1991) (offering a framework that encompasses the way in which a product can have a 
range of meanings for consumers from the “subjective, symbolic” to the “objective, tangible”); 
cf. Beebe, supra note 11, at 634 (discussing dyadic nature of signs in Ferdinand de Saussure’s 
semiotic theory).  
 86. See HEDING ET AL., supra note 42, at 154; cf. Beebe, supra note 11, at 630 (arguing 
that semiotics “holds that no element of experience is meaningful in itself”). To be clear, this 
conception of ownership does not trump the corporation’s claims to the mark; instead it accepts 
that as symbols, trademarks can be subject to consumers’ ability to take and interpret the mark 
in a personal ownership way.  
 87. See HEDING ET AL., supra note 42, at 156; Fournier, supra note 25, at 345  
 88. Fournier, supra note 25, at 345. 
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make it part of their lives.
89
 As Professor Susan Fournier explains, 
people are “not just buying brands because they like them or because 
they work well. They are involved in relationships with a collectivity of 
brands so as to benefit from the meanings they add into their lives. 
Some of these meanings are functional and utilitarian; others are more 
psychological and emotional.”90 
This shift in understanding the brand poses problems for the 
traditional brand manager. Rather than a distinct, prescribed method for 
applying the relational approach, business literature offers guidelines for 
managing a relational brand.
91
 In a relational approach, management 
must first understand that the brand’s meaning will vary with each 
consumer depending on the consumer’s place in his or her life. In 
addition, management needs to have a high degree of intimacy with its 
customers so it can understand “the context in which . . . products and 
services are used in the course of . . . customers’ day-to-day lives.”92 
This view of brands acknowledges, however, that if management 
only gathers data from consumers and never provides space for the 
consumer to act on the brand on his own, consumers will turn on the 
brand.
93
 Excessive data gathering, ignoring privacy, seeking to own the 
customer to the exclusion of other brands, or any other behavior that 
undermines the dyadic relationship, harms the relational brand and 
moves it away from a friendly interaction between equals.
94
  
In other words, management and marketing must let go of the brand 
and let it exist in the subjective “chaotic” hands of each customer.95 The 
advantage of this approach is that it releases management from the 
“unnecessarily restrictive and inherently limiting” view of brand loyalty 
and permits management to enhance its brand strategy.
96
 In a relational 
approach, management can study consumers’ “actual brand behaviors” 
with a more accurate understanding of how brand personality “is 
                                                                                                                     
 89. See HEDING ET AL., supra note 42, at 155; Fournier, supra note 25, at 367. 
 90. Fournier, supra note 25, at 361; accord Dreyfuss, supra note 22; see also Au-
Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 457 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(“Consumers sometimes buy products bearing marks such as the Nike Swoosh, the Playboy 
bunny ears, the Mercedes tri-point star, the Ferrari stallion, and countless sports franchise logos, 
for the appeal of the mark itself, without regard to whether it signifies the origin or sponsorship 
of the product.”). 
 91. See HEDING ET AL., supra note 42, at 171 (describing certain guidelines). 
 92. Susan Fournier et al., Preventing the Premature Death of Relationship Marketing, 76 
HARV. BUS. REV. 42, 49 (1998). 
 93. Id. at 43–44. 
 94. Id.; accord James H. McAlexander et al., Building Brand Community, 66 J. 
MARKETING 38, 51 (2002) (“In addition, marketers should recognize that relationships are 
reciprocal: Both parties give and receive.”); HEDING ET AL., supra note 42, at 172. 
 95. HEDING ET AL., supra note 42, at 175. 
 96. Fournier, supra note 25, at 368. 
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created, developed, and changed over time . . . thus enabling an 
important and sought-after link between managerial action and 
consumer response.”97 
2.  Community Brands 
The community approach to brands asks what happens when 
individual customers connect and form groups.
98
 This perspective 
addresses the way in which either face-to-face or technology-based 
sharing of positive and negative information through social networks—
from facts to impressions to rumors—affects brands.99 More precisely, 
this approach defines a brand community as “a specialized, non-
geographically bound community, based on a structured set of social 
relationships among admirers of a brand.”100  
A given brand community collectively negotiates with companies 
regarding the brand.
101
 The members of a brand community experience 
a connection to the brand, but they experience an even stronger bond 
with the other members of the brand community.
102
 In some cases, the 
marketer fosters these communities by encouraging and endorsing 
events (for example, Harley-Davidson rallies), and members share the 
brand meaning with the marketer.
103
 In other cases, an existing marketer 
                                                                                                                     
 97. Id. 
 98. See HEDING ET AL., supra note 42, at 183. One theorist has argued: 
[T]he value-expressive dimension of brand names, suggests that brand name 
usage performs a valuable social function by engendering feelings of 
community on the part of those who share the brand identification. This 
facilitation of group affiliation seems especially important in light of the loss of 
community that is said to commonly accompany life in complex societies such 
as contemporary America. 
Monroe Friedman, The Changing Language of Consumer Society: Brand Name Usage in 
Popular American Novels in the Postwar Era, 11 J. CONSUMER RES. 927, 936 (1985). 
 99. See HEDING ET AL., supra note 42, at 182–83. 
 100. Albert M. Muniz, Jr. & Thomas C. O’Guinn, Brand Community, 21 J. CONSUMER RES. 
412, 412 (2001); accord René Algesheimer et al., The Social Influence of Brand Community: 
Evidence from European Car Clubs, 69 J. MARKETING 19, 19 (2005). But see McAlexander, 
supra note 94, at 39 (arguing that brand communities are dynamic and may be geographically 
scattered or “may even exist in the entirely nongeographical space of the Internet”). 
 101. See HEDING ET AL., supra note 42, at 187. 
 102. See, e.g., Muniz & O’Guinn, supra note 100, at 414 (arguing that the Harley example 
is a subculture that operates within a different construct than the brand community); cf. 
Algesheimer et al., supra note 100, at 19 (stating that “identification with the brand community 
leads to positive consequences, such as greater community engagement, and negative 
consequences, such as normative community pressure and (ultimately) reactance”). 
 103. See HEDING ET AL., supra note 42, at 188; Muniz & O’Guinn, supra note 100, at 414; 
HOLT, supra note 56, at 156–57 (questioning the corporate role in this community branding 
event). 
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deploys the brand, but the community and the marketer co-create the 
brand meaning (for example, customer-started clubs and Web 
groups).
104
 One other variation operates with the community marketing 
the brand and creating its meaning (for example, Linux).
105
  
Brand communities present managers with opportunities and 
problems that are much larger than those recognized by the relational 
approach. The collective aspect of community brands provides greater 
leverage and a louder voice regarding a brand than the dispersed, 
subjective nature at the core of the relational approach.
106
 A potential 
benefit to the company comes from the way in which a community can 
be extremely loyal and promote the brand in ways that are quite 
influential, at times verging on evangelical zeal.
107
 This kind of group is 
almost a marketer’s dream, as the group is less likely to switch brands 
and often generates repeat purchases of the same item and across the 
brand in general.
108
 If the community decides, however, that 
management has taken a wrong turn, erred in its brand message, or 
transgressed the community’s vision in some way, the community can 
spread rumors about the brand, attack the marketer’s vision, and in 
some cases effectively hijack the brand to redirect its course to where 
management does not desire.
109
 The powerful Apple brand faced this 
problem in 1998 when it chose to abandon its Newton brand and move 
to the iMac and iPod brands. Loyal Newton fans created Web-based 
marketing and technical support for Newton consisting of 200,000 
supporters at its peak and continuing its vibrancy into the mid-2000s.
110
 
Nonetheless, by studying the way in which a brand community 
shapes the brand for the community itself, management can discern 
what consumers think about a brand and what the brand means to that 
community.
111
 This information allows the company to use latent brand 
power to resurrect a product (for example, the VW Beetle), align current 
products with the community’s views, and develop new products based 
                                                                                                                     
 104. McAlexander et al., supra note 94, at 38 (stating that “[w]e found consumers and 
marketers jointly building communities”); cf. Algesheimer, supra note 100, at 30 (finding that 
when a company tried to draft new or potential customers into a brand community, such efforts 
were less effective because the customers were not already fully engaged with the brand). 
 105. See HEDING ET AL., supra note 42, at 190. 
 106. See Muniz & O’Guinn, supra note 100, at 426–27.  
 107. Id. at 427; McAlexander, supra note 94, at 43–44 (applying ethnography to a Jeep 
brand event, Jeep Jamboree, and noting “enthusiasm” and the “fervent expression of missionary 
zeal” by some participants); accord HEDING ET AL., supra note 42, at 197. 
 108. See Muniz & O’Guinn, supra note 100, at 427. 
 109. See HEDING ET AL., supra note 42, at 197. 
 110. See Albert M. Muñiz Jr. & Hope Jensen Schau, Religiosity in the Abandoned Apple 
Newton Brand Community, 31 J. CONSUMER RES. 737, 737–38 (2005); accord HEDING ET AL., 
supra note 42, at 184. 
 111. Muñiz & Schau, supra note 110, at 738. 
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on the community meaning.
112
 But just as the relational approach 
requires that management respect the individual, brand communities 
require that management should not overstep its bounds through actions 
such as spying on the community, pushing or manipulating it, inserting 
members into the community, selling into the community, or otherwise 
exploiting the community-developed brand mystique because such acts 
will offend the community.
113
  
In sum, the brand community approach sees brands as “social 
objects,” “socially constructed,” and “created as much by consumers as 
marketers.”114 Made up of loyal consumers, the brand community 
affects all aspects of how the brand is seen by spreading both positive 
and negative impressions about the brand.
115
 Companies with strong 
brand communities can rely on them to maintain the relationship 
between the company and multiple consumers without the company 
having to maintain as many one-on-one relationships.
116
 In place of a 
one-way dictatorial system for brands, the community approach 
presents a democratic understanding of brands.
117
 
It seems, however, that we have two dimensions of brands that may 
never connect: the corporate and the noncorporate. Despite the 
evolution of brand theory regarding consumers and communities, some 
may think that the noncorporate dimensions of brands have little to say 
to a corporation and the marketplace. And one may think that 
noncorporate actors care little for what the corporation offers regarding 
a brand. Yet recent scholarship on the co-creation of value shows the 
opposite to be true.  
The idea of co-creation has taken hold in many fields, such as the 
open source movement, innovation and tool kit theory, and 
marketing.
118
 As business strategy and marketing Professors C.K. 
Prahalad and Venkat Ramaswamy explain, at a general level: 
                                                                                                                     
 112. See, e.g., Muniz & O’Guinn, supra note 100, at 427 (describing how Saab responded 
to community feedback regarding changes). 
 113. Id. at 415, 424, 427 (noting consumers are sensitive to authenticity problems in 
consumer culture and documenting brand community reactions to shift in corporate 
management and strategy); HEDING ET AL., supra note 42, at 198–99.  
 114. Muniz & O’Guinn, supra note 100, at 427–28; see also Schau et al., supra note 41, at 
30 (arguing that the new revolution of co-creation of the brand is occurring). 
 115. Albert M. Muñiz Jr. & Hope Jensen Schau, Vigilante Marketing and Consumer-
Created Communications, 36 J. ADVERTISING 187, 187 (2007) (“Consumers creating such 
content are acting as self-appointed promoters of the brand and often have firm convictions 
regarding what is right and wrong for it.”); accord Muniz & O’Guinn, supra note 100, at 427. 
 116. See Muniz & O’Guinn, supra note 100, at 427. 
 117. Id. at 428. 
 118. See, e.g., James Bessen, Open Source Software: Free Provision of Complex Public 
Goods, in THE ECONOMICS OF OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT 57, 67 (Jürgen Bitzer & 
Philipp J.H. Schröder eds., 2006) (describing the problem of creating a specific iteration of 
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The meaning of value and the process of value creation are 
rapidly shifting from a product- and firm-centric view to 
personalized consumer experiences. Informed, networked, 
empowered, and active consumers are increasingly co-
creating value with the firm. The interaction between the 
firm and the consumer is becoming the locus of value 
creation and value extraction.
119
 
Modern brand practices and strategies have embraced this outlook. 
Brand theory’s cultural understanding of brands combined with an 
information network perspective offers a full picture of brands where 
corporations and active consumers co-create value.  
C.  Synthesis: The Cultural, Networked Brand 
The cultural approach to branding explains the dynamic, co-creative 
nature of brands. Cultural theory understood culture as a toolkit for 
some time prior to the adoption of this view in the business literature. 
Professor Ann Swidler’s groundbreaking article, Culture in Action: 
Symbols and Strategies, argues that culture provides “tool kit[s]” for 
certain “strategies of action” and that “both the influence and the fate of 
cultural meanings depend on the strategies of action they support.”120 In 
the tool kit understanding of culture, “how culture shapes or constrains 
action, and more generally, how culture interacts with social 
structure . . . var[ies] across time and historical situation.”121 
Recent work has argued that brands are cultural artifacts that 
function in ways that conform to Swidler’s theory. Douglas Holt, a 
leader of the cultural approach to branding, explains: 
                                                                                                                     
complex software); Nikolaus Franke & Frank Piller, Value Creation by Toolkits for User 
Innovation and Design: The Case of the Watch Market, 21 J. PRODUCT INNOVATION MGMT. 401, 
402 (2004) (comparing the practices of releasing a product and toolkit in different industries and 
finding “[t]he rationale underlying the toolkit, however, is the same: it allows the customer to 
take an active part in product development”); C.K. Prahalad & Venkat Ramaswamy, Co-
Creation Experiences: The Next Practice in Value Creation, 18 J. INTERACTIVE MARKETING 5, 
10–13 (2004) (describing co-creation in interactive marketing); Stefan Thomke & Eric von 
Hippel, Customers as Innovators: A New Way to Create Value, 80 HARV. BUS. REV. 74 passim 
(2002) (describing a form of co-creation); Stephen L. Vargo & Robert F. Lusch, Evolving to a 
New Dominant Logic for Marketing, 68 J. MARKETING 1, 1, 12 (2004) (describing co-creation in 
marketing). 
 119. Prahalad & Ramaswamy, supra note 118, at 5. 
 120. Ann Swidler, Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies, 51 AM. SOC. REV. 273, 273, 
284 (1986); see also Paul DiMaggio, Culture and Cognition, 23 ANN. REV. SOC. 263, 268 
(1997) (arguing that cognitive research “reinforces the ‘toolkit’” view of culture). 
 121. Swidler, supra note 120, at 284.  
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Consumers will look for brands to contribute directly to 
their identity projects by providing original and relevant 
cultural materials with which to work. So brands will 
become another form of expressive culture, no different in 
principle from films or television programs or rock bands 
(which, in turn, are increasingly treated and perceived as 
brands). Brands that create worlds that strike consumers’ 
imaginations, that inspire and provoke and stimulate, that 
help them interpret the world that surrounds them, will earn 
kudos and profits.
122
 
The brand must be part of shaping mainstream culture, but it is also 
“subjected to social and cultural changes.”123  
In the cultural theory approach to brands, brands change and move 
through time
124
: “[T]he brand is a vessel of meaning and myth making, 
successful only if it resonates with consumers’ collective identity 
projects of the time.”125 In short, brands can have an effect on culture, 
and culture can have an effect on brands. Brand managers seek to 
understand the social and cultural currents of a given time and then 
generate a story to fit that moment. 
Of course, as consumers or communities bond with a brand, they 
may begin to criticize the brand.
126
 For example, the antibrand or “No 
Logo” movement provides strong criticism of branding.127 Naomi 
Klein, author of No Logo, makes a strong case that brands in general 
pose significant problems for society—from changing the availability of 
open space for expression, to reducing meaningful choice in the 
marketplace, to altering labor mechanisms such that high-paying jobs 
are scarce and labor is exploited in developing countries.
128
  
The movement advocates culture jamming—the distortion of brand 
images and messages and the overt rejection of consumerism—as a way 
                                                                                                                     
 122. Douglas B. Holt, Why Do Brands Cause Trouble? A Dialectical Theory of Consumer 
Culture and Branding, 29 J. CONSUMER RES. 70, 87 (2002). 
 123. HEDING ET AL., supra note 42, at 211. 
 124. HOLT, supra note 56, at 215; cf. Swidler, supra note 120, at 284. 
 125. HEDING ET AL., supra note 42, at 210. 
 126. See Craig J. Thomson et al., Emotional Branding and the Strategic Value of the 
Doppelganger Brand Image, 70 J. MARKETING 50, 51–52 (2006). 
 127. See NAOMI KLEIN, NO LOGO passim (2002) (describing the No Logo movement); 
accord Holt, supra note 122, at 70 (noting Klein’s book, Kalle Lasn’s book and magazine  
Adbusters, and Eric Schlosser’s Fast Food Nation as part of the antibrand movement); see also 
KYLE BAGWELL, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ADVERTISING 99 (2005) (noting that part of the 
antibrand movement’s concern is that corporate culture is displacing bottom-up culture); 
HEDING ET AL., supra note 42, at 220–21 (describing the No Logo movement).  
 128. See KLEIN, supra note 127. 
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to allow people to shape culture and comment on corporate practices.
129
 
Part of culture jamming may entail creating a doppelgänger brand, “a 
family of disparaging images and stories about a brand that are 
circulated in popular culture by a loosely organized network of 
consumers, antibrand activists, bloggers, and opinion leaders in the 
news and entertainment media.”130  
In addition, this group’s sensitivity to corporate power has fostered 
monitoring agendas, which scrutinize corporate impact on social issues 
such as labor and the environment.
131
 This action has spurred corporate 
awareness and in some cases greater attention to corporate social 
responsibility. In Holt’s words, “Today, culture jamming is more 
frequently used to attack disjunctures between brand promises and 
corporate actions.”132  
One might argue that in the antibrand context, “[i]nformed, 
networked, empowered, and active consumers” seem to be 
“increasingly [destroying] value with the firm. The interaction between 
the firm and the consumer is becoming the locus of value [loss].”133 
Indeed, as discussed later in this Article, a common response to many 
brand critical acts is to cry foul and try to stifle such commentary by 
claiming that the acts cause trademark confusion, dilution, or both.
134
 
That perspective, however, clings to a product- or producer-centered 
view of brands, in which goods and information are under corporate 
control in a one-way system.  
Negative information offered from the noncorporate side may be 
more important than positive information. Some brand literature argues 
that antibrand acts, especially the emergence of doppelgänger brands—
reinterpretations of a brand that present disparaging images and 
meanings—are useful sources of information for business and brand 
strategy: 
[A] doppelgänger brand image functions as a diagnostic 
tool that can reveal latent brand image problems that could 
eventually blossom into a full-fledged brand image crisis. 
More specifically, the analysis of a doppelgänger brand 
image can (1) call attention to cultural contradictions that 
could potentially undermine the perceived authenticity of a 
                                                                                                                     
 129. See Holt, supra note 122, at 85. 
 130. See Thomson et al., supra note 126, at 50. 
 131. See HEDING ET AL., supra note 42, at 218, 220, 221. 
 132. Holt, supra note 122, at 85. 
 133. Prahalad & Ramaswamy, supra note 118, at 5. 
 134. See Thomson et al., supra note 126, at 50; see also Deven R. Desai & Sandra L. 
Rierson, Confronting the Genericism Conundrum, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1789, 1791 (2007) 
(discussing the growth of aggressive trademark litigation). 
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firm’s emotional branding strategy, (2) provide early 
warning signs that an emotional-branding story is 
beginning to lose its value as an authenticating narrative for 
consumers’ identity projects, and (3) offer insights into 
how an emotional-branding strategy can be reconfigured to 
fit better with changing cultural times and shifting 
consumer outlooks.
135
 
Insofar as a company offers and trades information about the benefits of 
its brand—from product quality, to image, to identity, to emotional, 
relationship, to socially responsible production methods, or any other 
benefit—the doppelgänger brand and similar commentaries by 
consumers and communities offer valuable information regarding how 
the brand offering is received.  
Furthermore when brands function as two-way information 
resources, it opens the possibility of co-creating value: 
As consumers peel away the brand veneer, they are looking 
for companies that act like a local merchant, as a stalwart 
citizen of the community. What consumers will want to 
touch, soon enough, is the way in which companies treat 
people when they are not customers. Brands will be trusted 
to serve as cultural source materials when their sponsors 
have demonstrated that they shoulder civic responsibilities 
as would a community pillar.
136
 
In other words, the brand is a key vehicle by which a company 
communicates with society. And in turn, the brand is a key vehicle by 
which society communicates with a company. 
As consumers have become more aware of corporate behavior and 
its impact on society, authenticity and openness have taken a central 
role in what is demanded from a brand.
137
 Rather than the cool, 
                                                                                                                     
 135. See Thomson et al., supra note 126, at 51. Although the doppelgänger idea is couched 
in terms of emotional branding, there is no reason that it cannot apply to any brand. As 
Professor Sonia Katyal has noted, antibranding practices similar to doppelgänger practices may 
target a specific brand while also targeting general social matters, such as questioning alcohol 
consumption, the use of child labor, the cigarette industry, and commitments to alternative 
energy. See Sonia K. Katyal, Stealth Marketing and Antibranding: The Love that Dare Not 
Speak Its Name, 58 BUFFALO L. REV. 795, 807–09 (2010). Such acts can inform a company that 
certain practices are not favored by at least some of the populace. 
 136. Holt, supra note 122, at 88. 
 137. See Prahalad & Ramaswamy, supra note 118, at 8 (stating that “[c]onsumers expect 
transparency”); cf. Isabelle Maignan & O.C. Ferrell, Corporate Social Responsibility and 
Marketing: An Integrative Framework, 32 J. ACAD. MARKETING SCI. 3, 8 (2004) (noting the 
transparency of financial information). 
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manipulative brand that pretends profits are not part of the corporate 
agenda, corporations can, and perhaps must, be transparent about what 
they are doing and acknowledge their duty to improve society in 
general.  
In market terms, the brand is an information device and part of a 
network consisting of the product, the corporation, the consumer, and 
the community. The new reality is that a company’s ability to have full 
command and control over the brand is diminished, if not gone 
completely. Instead, brands are subject to ongoing interaction and 
definition. The company and its product may initiate the relationship, 
but power diffuses after that moment. Consumers and communities 
ultimately create value specific to themselves and simultaneously create 
the opportunity for value creation on the company side.  
Thus, the use of the term “side” is arguably incorrect. Prahalad and 
Ramaswamy offer that “[t]he interaction between the firm and the 
consumer is becoming the locus of value creation and value extraction” 
for all connected to the brand.
138
 There are sides, but they work in a 
symbiotic, not antagonistic, manner. 
II.  A BRAND THEORY EXPLANATION OF TRADEMARK LAW 
Trademark law protects the corporate dimensions of brands but is 
not clear as to how and why it does so. As trademark law has evolved, 
the claimed search cost, utilitarian goals of trademark had to be relaxed 
if not twisted to achieve protection of the corporate brand interests. 
Fundamental parts of trademark law can be explained as protecting and 
growing the corporate dimension of brands, rather than adhering to a 
search cost theory of trademarks. For example, the anonymous source 
doctrine and concept of goodwill grew to support the corporate side of 
brands. In addition, several doctrinal puzzles within trademark law that 
are difficult to reconcile with the traditional law and economics 
explanation of trademarks
139
 are easily understood from a brand 
perspective. These aspects further demonstrate how trademark law is an 
unwitting servant of the corporate side of brands. 
                                                                                                                     
 138. Prahalad & Ramaswamy, supra note 118, at 5. 
 139. As Beebe has put it, insofar as trademark theory rests easy and relies on law and 
economics it “cannot explain, predict, or justify certain outcomes in [trademark] law, nor can it 
articulate the need for necessary reforms.” See Beebe, supra note 11, at 624 (arguing that law 
and economics cannot explain the “concepts of trademark ‘distinctiveness’ and trademark 
‘dilution’”).  
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A.  From Direct Competition to Anonymous Source 
The law and economics view of trademarks tracks early brand 
scholarship’s view of product brands almost exactly.140 Early brand 
scholarship looked at the brand as product-related; the brand reduces 
search costs so consumers can process information quickly as they 
decide what to purchase.
141
 Professor William Landes and Judge 
Richard Posner summarize and conflate how trademarks and brands 
function:  
[A] trademark conveys information that allows the 
consumer to say to himself, “I need not investigate the 
attributes of the brand I am about to purchase because the 
trademark is a shorthand way of telling me that the 
attributes are the same as that of the brand I enjoyed 
earlier.”142  
The views are so close that leading marketing theorists often also 
conflate brands and trademarks by defining a brand as “a name, 
trademark, logo, or other symbol.”143 
Yet, in the beginning, trademark law was supposed to protect 
against “directly competing products and passing off or source 
confusion.”144 The U.S. Supreme Court’s explanation of a trademark’s 
purpose in Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf captures the essence of 
the strict source doctrine: “to identify the origin or ownership of the 
article to which it is affixed.”145 In a world of limited travel and local 
production, the strict source doctrine—the doctrine holding that 
consumers “knew or cared to know the actual source of the brand they 
were buying”146—may have matched how brands functioned in the 
marketplace. But as the economy shifted to mass production and 
                                                                                                                     
 140. The economic rationale behind trademark law is that trademarks should be protected 
because they are economically efficient; trademarks help to minimize consumers’ search costs, 
the pre-purchase analysis a consumer performs to make her purchase decision. See, e.g., Ann 
Bartow, Likelihood of Confusion, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 721, 729–30 (2004); Stephen L. Carter, 
The Trouble with Trademark, 99 YALE L.J. 759, 762 (1990).  
 141. See HEDING ET AL., supra note 42, at 33. 
 142. Landes & Posner, supra note 10, at 269. 
 143. PHILIP KOTLER, MARKETING MANAGEMENT 404 (2000). David Aaker argues that a 
brand is “a distinguishing name and/or symbol (such as a logo, trademark, or package design) 
intended to identify the goods or services of either one seller or a group of sellers, and to 
differentiate those goods or services from those of competitors.” DAVID A. AAKER, MANAGING 
BRAND EQUITY: CAPITALIZING ON THE VALUE OF A BRAND NAME 7 (1991). 
 144. Bone, supra note 8, at 593; see also Glynn Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 
EMORY L.J. 367, 391 (1999); Nelson, supra note 52, at 742–44. 
 145. Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412 (1916). 
 146. Beebe, supra note 11, at 678. 
30
Florida Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 4 [2012], Art. 5
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol64/iss4/5
2012] FROM TRADEMARKS TO BRANDS 1011 
 
distribution on a national scale, this doctrine became suspect.
147
 Once 
companies moved beyond direct competition, trademark theory and law 
struggled to find a way to explain what trademarks protect.  
Within a decade of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Hanover Star 
Milling Co., Frank Schechter argued that “the ramifications of modern 
trade and the national and international distribution of goods from the 
manufacturer through the jobber or importer and the retailer to the 
consumer, [created a situation where] the source or origin of the goods 
bearing a well known trademark is seldom known to the consumer.”148 
By the 1930s, national manufacturers had established their brands, and 
trademark law began protecting those interests. Responding to the facts 
that Schechter presented—that no one knew the source—courts 
embraced the anonymous source doctrine. 
The doctrine holds that a trademark must represent a single source, 
but consumers do not have to know the precise origin of a good.
149
 It 
implicitly recognizes that consumers look to a product brand rather than 
the corporate source as they make purchasing decisions. As Professor 
Barton Beebe has shown, the doctrine allows for the creation of 
hypermarks, which “are not designations of source, but commodified 
simulations of such designations. . . . Their sign value is the source of 
their economic value.”150 In other words, the mark itself is the thing 
which has value and is purchased. Here, the mark becomes the 
product—which is quite a brand way of looking at trademarks. 
B.  An Expansive View of Goodwill, Merchandising, and Licensing 
A core doctrine in trademark law, the goodwill doctrine, exemplifies 
how trademark law supports the shift from a product-level to a 
corporate-level brand. The rise of the idea of goodwill as it relates to 
trademarks tracks brand logic better than competition and search cost 
rationales. Trademark law holds that marks have no intrinsic value; 
rather, they are symbols of goodwill.
151
 Trademarks do not have 
property rights in gross with the same strong exclusionary and 
                                                                                                                     
 147. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Brett H. McDonnell, Trademarks and the Boundaries of the 
Firm, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 345, 353 (2009); Lars Smith, Trade Distinctiveness: Solving 
Scalia’s Tertium Quid Trade Dress Conundrum, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 243, 260. 
 148. Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 
813, 814 (1927) (citing McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245 (1877), and Charles Broadway Rouss, 
Inc. v. Winchester Co., 300 F. 706, 722–23 (2d Cir. 1924), cert. denied, 266 U.S. 607 (1924)); 
accord LURY, supra note 45, at 19 (describing early brand strategy as seeking to “circumvent or 
limit the role of the retailer”). 
 149. Beebe, supra note 11, at 678. 
 150. Id. at 669. 
 151. See Bone, supra note 8, at 560 (“The locus of the property eventually shifted from the 
mark itself to the value underlying the mark, which was called ‘goodwill.’”). 
31
Resai: From Trademarks to Brands
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2012
1012 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64 
 
temporary monopoly power that patent and copyright law enjoy.
152
 
Instead, “the trademark holder’s right to prohibit others’ use of the mark 
is limited to circumstances in which that use harms consumers, as 
determined via the ‘likelihood of confusion’ standard.”153  
Yet, cases in the 1930s and 1940s enjoined the use of marks even 
when direct competition and source confusion over products—the 
touchstones of early trademark law
154—were lacking.155 To explain this 
shift, courts had to fashion a new way of understanding what 
trademarks represent while trying to maintain its claimed foundation in 
protecting consumers and reducing search costs. Professor Robert Bone 
has explained that this new approach “focused on the goodwill that a 
mark symbolized and protected that goodwill as the seller’s property. 
This goodwill-as-property theory was flexible enough to support broad 
trademark protection provided ‘goodwill’ was defined to include 
goodwill that attached to the firm as well as to the particular brand.”156 
Courts were protecting firm-level interests, not product-level ones.  
Nonetheless, courts held that one could not assign a mark without 
the goodwill, because to allow assignment without goodwill would 
permit one company to use the mark but change the product, and this 
practice would disrupt the public’s ability to rely on the mark as a 
conveyor of information about a certain product.
157
 Until the 1930s, 
courts often required the transfer of the entire business.
158
 Short of that 
requirement, courts frequently required the transfer of the means of 
production or some type of tangible asset as part of a mark assignment, 
and they invalidated assignments if the original mark holder continued 
to make similar products, even under a different mark.
159
 
The ban on assignment without goodwill comes from an era when 
the product was the key to the transaction. That idea is ill-suited to a 
                                                                                                                     
 152. See United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 98 (1918) (“In truth, a 
trade-mark confers no monopoly whatever in a proper sense, but is merely a convenient means 
for facilitating the protection of one’s good-will in trade by placing a distinguishing mark or 
symbol—a commercial signature—upon the merchandise or package in which it is sold.”); 
accord Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 413–14 (1916). 
 153. See Desai & Rierson, supra note 134, at 1801. 
 154. Bone, supra note 8, at 593 (noting that “directly competing products and passing off 
or source confusion” described most trademark cases prior to 1920); accord Lunney, supra note 
144, at 391; Nelson, supra note 52, at 742–44.  
 155. See Bone, supra note 8, at 595–96; accord Nelson, supra note 52, at 742–44. 
 156. Bone, supra note 8, at 493 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted); cf. Lunney, supra 
note 144, at 371–72 (explaining the growth of “property mania” in trademark law (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 157. See Lunney, supra note 144, at 410.  
 158. See Lisa H. Johnston, Note, Drifting Toward Trademark Rights in Gross, 85 
TRADEMARK REP. 19, 23–24 (1995). 
 159. See Lunney, supra note 144, at 410. 
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world where intangible assets, especially corporate brands and other 
levels of branding, are the concern. But, as Bone observes, “Goodwill 
protection has nothing directly to do with facilitating consumer choice 
or safeguarding the quality of market information.”160 That was and is 
the point. 
From the beginning of corporate branding in the 1920s, business 
interests argued that the prohibition of assignment of a mark without 
goodwill needed to be relaxed. When the Lanham Act was passed in 
1946, the law changed so that “a mark, and its goodwill, could be 
assigned separately from the business, thus incorporating some of the 
ideas of those who advocated free trademark transferability.”161 By the 
1970s, courts had dropped most of the narrow requirements of the past, 
and marks were allowed to be transferred without any tangible assets in 
tow as long as the new mark holder’s products were substantially 
similar to the previous holder’s products. By the 1990s, these standards 
were further relaxed, and new mark holder products only needed to be 
sufficiently similar and sometimes could be on entirely different 
products as long as consumers were not confused.
162
 These more recent 
changes occurred just as the business world began to recognize that a 
large portion of a company’s value lay in its brand.163 
Trademark doctrine’s move to include confusion over sponsorship is 
another example of the move from product to corporate branding. 
Embracing a broad notion of sponsorship “expanded the range of 
actionable confusion beyond confusion over the actual source of a 
product—trademark law’s traditional concern—to include claims 
against uses that might confuse consumers about whether the trademark 
owner sponsors or is affiliated with the defendant’s goods.”164 Courts 
explained this new level of protection came from the belief that 
trademark law should protect against the “loss of current customers due 
                                                                                                                     
 160. Bone, supra note 8, at 549. 
 161. See Irene Calboli, Trademark Assignment “With Goodwill”: A Concept Whose Time 
Has Gone, 57 FLA. L. REV. 771, 786 (2005). But see Lunney, supra note 144, at 411–12 
(arguing that the rejection of specific language allowing such transfers indicates that courts have 
ignored the rule against assignment in gross).  
 162. Cf. Carter, supra note 140, at 785–86 (criticizing the Trademark Law Revision Act of 
1988 for “effectively eliminat[ing] the traditional restriction on the transfer of a mark in gross, 
and thereby creat[ing] a potential market in trademarks—the very creature the Lanham Act’s 
original sponsors long ago promised that Federal rights would not create”); Calboli, supra note 
161, at 791–93 (discussing cases that used the sufficient similarity standard to allow 
assignments that are arguably in gross). 
 163. See infra note 190 and accompanying text. 
 164. Lemley & McKenna, supra note 12, at 414 (emphasis added); cf. Bone, supra note 8, 
at 493 (“The way a defendant injured or appropriated a plaintiff’s firm goodwill was by 
confusing consumers about sponsorship. Therefore, protecting a mark against sponsorship 
confusion prevented harm to the seller at the same time as preventing harm to the consumer.”). 
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to a reputation injury created by defendant’s lower quality product, or 
loss of future customers due to the plaintiff’s inability to enter a new 
market with its mark.”165  
This understanding fits well within the corporate brand perspective. 
Brand scholarship explicitly takes the view that a brand is built around a 
reputation and a company, “not around products.”166 Corporate brand 
strategy sees the brand as a vehicle that allows a corporation to create 
diffusion products; thus, a company can offer not just one product but a 
range of goods and services at different prices and market points so that 
a range of people can have “access to the brand.”167 When trademark 
doctrine protects a company’s ability to enter new markets, the doctrine 
maps to the idea that a corporation will wish to leverage its corporate 
brand to offer products across a range of new market segments.  
Furthermore, if trademark law took source and quality protection 
seriously, merchandising and licensing would have been cabined or 
possibly banned. Trademark law ostensibly prohibits pure 
merchandising or naked licensing of a mark because these practices 
would arguably harm the mark’s role in offering information about the 
source and quality of goods or services. In practice, however, trademark 
law permits precisely these behaviors. Businesses operating under a 
brand view of marks benefit from this permissive approach.  
Professor Irene Calboli’s work helps show the problem. The 
following amalgam blends her hypothetical examples on trademark 
licensing and assignment in gross to show the realities of how many 
businesses operate and the brand environment consumers encounter: 
Imagine that you are seated in the STARBUCKS coffee 
shop in front of your school sipping your coffee from a 
STARBUCKS mug. The coffee tastes richer than usual; 
you then notice a label on the shop door, and on your 
coffee cup, announcing that a new owner has purchased the 
mark STARBUCKS and has changed the quality of some 
of the STARBUCKS products. Throughout the rest of the 
day you see people wearing branded clothing, a HARLEY-
DAVIDSON T-shirt here, a YANKEES hat there. 
Now, imagine that a South-African corporation has 
                                                                                                                     
 165. Bone, supra note 8, at 599 (citing Dwinell-Wright Co. v. White House Milk Co., 132 
F.2d. 822, 825 (2d Cir. 1943) (Hand, J.); S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Johnson, 116 F.2d 427, 
429 (2d Cir. 1940) (Hand, J.)); cf. Nelson, supra note 52, at 743–45. 
 166. See LURY, supra note 45, at 122 (quoting KLEIN, supra note 127, at 22) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 167. Id. at 25, 61–62 (quoting Christopher M. Moore, Streets of Style: Fashion Designer 
Retailing Within London and New York, in COMMERCIAL CULTURES: ECONOMIES, PRACTICES, 
SPACES 261, 269 (Peter Jackson et al. eds., 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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acquired the Coca-Cola Company and announces that it 
will not continue to produce the well-known soft drink. 
Instead, it will use the mark COCA-COLA on a variety of 
salty snacks.
168
 
One may encounter a range of branded goods, but whether those goods 
are from the original source, whether the company manufactured the 
goods, and whether the goods have anything to do with a company’s 
core goods or services are open questions each time one encounters the 
brand.  
Put simply, companies seek to extend their brands. Licensing is a 
key way to accomplish this goal and can be quite lucrative.
169
 As 
Calboli explains, one can think of three types of licensing: licensing, 
where a company outsources manufacture of its products; collateral 
licensing, where a company allows another company to produce a 
related good with the company’s mark (such as GE, an appliance 
company, permitting another company to produce phones); and 
promotional or trademark merchandising licensing, where a company 
brands products unrelated to its products, such as hats, water, and coffee 
mugs.
170
  
Yet prior to the passage of the Lanham Act in 1946, trademark law 
traditionally disfavored trademark licensing.
171
 Just as one could not 
assign a mark, one could not, in theory, lend a mark. Marks were 
supposed to indicate origin. Licensing a mark to another logically 
undercuts that function.
172
 The MacMahan rule explains the point: 
                                                                                                                     
 168. The above hypothetical includes both direct quotes and paraphrases from Irene 
Calboli, The Sunset of “Quality Control” In Modern Trademark Licensing, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 
341, 342 (2007) [hereinafter Calboli, Sunset], and Calboli, supra note 161, at 772. I thank 
Professor Irene Calboli for allowing me to adapt her examples for this Article. 
 169. See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right: Fragile Theory 
or Fait Accompli?, 54 EMORY L.J. 461, 461 (2005) (“Trademark merchandising is big business. 
One marketing consultant estimated the global market for licensing and marketing sports-related 
merchandise at $17 billion in 2001. The college-logo retail market was estimated at $3 billion in 
2003. The 2002 Salt Lake Olympics generated $500 million in gross sales—and $34 million in 
licensing revenues—from sale of ‘Olympics’ attire.” (footnotes omitted)); Alfred M. Marks, 
Trademark Licensing—Towards a More Flexible Standard, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 641, 645–47 
(1988) (detailing the economic value of trademark licensing in the billions of dollars); Kevin 
Parks, “Naked” Is Not a Four-Letter Word: Debunking the Myth of the “Quality Control 
Requirement” in Trademark Licensing, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 531, 558 (1992) (“Trademark 
licensing is an accepted, widespread business practice which has and will continue to grow 
exponentially, adding tens of billions of dollars to the national and international economies.”). 
 170. See Calboli, Sunset, supra note 168, at 348–50.  
 171. See Marks, supra note 169, at 643–44 (citing Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, 
Inc., 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959)). 
 172. See Calboli, Sunset, supra note 168, at 344. 
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A trade-mark cannot be assigned, or its use licensed, except 
as incidental to a transfer of the business or property in 
connection with which it has been used. An assignment or 
license without such a transfer is totally inconsistent with 
the theory upon which the value of a trade-mark depends 
and its appropriation by an individual is permitted. The 
essential value of a trade-mark is that it identifies to the 
trade the merchandise upon which it appears as of a certain 
origin, or as the property of a certain person.
173
 
Regardless, courts often allowed licensing as long as the company 
monitored the licensee to ensure consistent quality of goods and the 
contract for the license had language explicitly permitting such 
control.
174
  
The Lanham Act explicitly allowed licensing to related 
companies,
175
 provided that quality control was maintained; but neither 
the case law nor the statute provided guidance regarding the proper 
amount of control.
176
 Instead, “courts progressively relaxed the 
interpretation of the control that licensors must exercise over their 
licensees and held that first ‘adequate,’ then ‘sufficient,’ and then 
‘minimal’ control was sufficient to fulfill the statutory requirement.”177  
Merchandising licensing is simply not about the origin or source of 
a product. Rather, it is about how a consumer uses a branded good “to 
                                                                                                                     
 173. MacMahan Pharmacal Co. v. Denver Chem. Mfg. Co., 113 F. 468, 474–75 (8th Cir. 
1901). 
 174. See Marks, supra note 169, at 643; see also Calboli, Sunset, supra note 168, at 344 
(“Judicial decisions [previous to the passage of the Lanham Act] paved the way for this shift, 
accepting that trademarks could indicate commercial origin not only as actual product sources, 
but also in terms of consumers’ expectations by guaranteeing that all products bearing the same 
mark shared the same quality regardless of the manufacturer.”); David J. Franklyn, The 
Apparent Manufacturer Doctrine, Trademark Licensors and the Third Restatement of Torts, 49 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 671, 682 (1999) (noting that trademarks as guarantees were a function of 
satisfaction, not quality, but that the quality view took hold and remained the dominant 
understanding). 
 175. 15 U.S.C. § 1055 (2006). 
 176. See Radiance A. Walters, Partial Forfeiture: The Best Compromise in Trademark 
Licensing Protocol, 91 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 126, 131 (2009) (“[T]he Lanham Act 
does not explicitly define quality control. As a result, courts have interpreted the meaning of 
quality control inconsistently, which has led to an ambiguous standard for validating trademark 
licensing.”); accord Calboli, Sunset, supra note 168, at 345 (“[L]ike the judiciary before its 
adoption, the statute neither provided a definition of ‘quality’ and ‘control’ nor indicated how 
much control must be used for licensing to be valid. As a result, courts continued to interpret the 
requirement case by case.”). 
 177. Calboli, Sunset, supra note 168, at 346. 
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identify with the trademark owner.”178 The combination of the reduction 
of control standards to “minimal” and the growth of licensing, 
especially merchandising licensing, stretches the claim that a mark 
indicates source and quality arguably to its breaking point.  
Furthermore, although consumers can know full well that a branded 
item is not licensed—they are not confused nor do they lack information 
as they purchase—trademark law will prevent unlicensed manufacturers 
from producing such goods.
179
 Boston Professional Hockey Ass’n v. 
Dallas Cap & Emblem Manufacturing
180
 is the key case in this shift.
181
 
In that case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the 
unlicensed manufacture of embroidered National Hockey League team 
emblems was a trademark violation even though consumers were not 
confused.
182
 The court’s explanation reveals the brand trend in this area 
of trademark law: 
[T]he district court overlooked the fact that the act was 
amended to eliminate the source of origin as being the only 
focal point of confusion. . . . [I]t can be argued, the buyer is 
not confused or deceived. This argument misplaces the 
purpose of the confusion requirement. The confusion or 
deceit requirement is met by the fact that the defendant 
duplicated the protected trademarks and sold them to the 
public knowing that the public would identify them as 
being the teams’ trademarks. The certain knowledge of the 
buyer that the source and origin of the trademark symbols 
were in plaintiffs [sic] satisfies the requirement of the act. 
The argument that confusion must be as to the source of the 
manufacture of the emblem itself is unpersuasive, where 
the trademark, originated by the team, is the triggering 
mechanism for the sale of the emblem.
183
 
First, the Lanham Act itself expanded to move beyond source to include 
sponsorship or affiliation as a basis for infringement. Second, that shift 
allows one to conclude that consumers are buying the product because it 
                                                                                                                     
 178. W.J. Keating, Promotional Trademark Licensing: A Concept Whose Time Has Come, 
89 DICK. L. REV. 363, 372 (1985).  
 179. See Calboli, supra note 161, at 799; see also LURY, supra note 45, at 108 (explaining 
that British trademark law was revised in 1994 to allow trafficking in a mark which is analogous 
to the U.S. merchandising right).  
 180. 510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1975). 
 181. Parks, supra note 169, at 565–66; accord Dogan & Lemley, supra note 169, at 473–
74. 
 182. Boston Hockey, 510 F.2d at 1008–09, 1012. 
 183. Id. at 1012 (emphasis added). 
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bears the mark.
184
 The purchase is “triggered” by the mark being on the 
good in question. Confusion is not the problem; trademark law now 
protects the mark being bought and sold as a commodity.
185
 
Protecting this approach to marked products fits into the brand view 
of trademarks far better than the trademark view. Source is no longer an 
issue. Quality control is now minimal and, perhaps as a de facto matter, 
abandoned by courts as they defer to the realities of business 
practices.
186
 Insofar as companies use brands to build relationships with 
customers and offer them ways to embrace the brand as a way of life in 
many if not all parts of their lives, merchandising rights cases protect a 
company’s interest in generating and controlling consumer identity. 
Consumers may want to express themselves through wearing a good 
with a mark. Having a generous trademark law that protects a 
company’s ability to exploit that identity value protects a corporate 
brand interest, not a source or quality interest.  
Once a company attains success with its licensing strategies, it 
increases its overall value.
187
 After all, if people are buying a brand as a 
brand, then that brand has value. Indeed, well before modern 
assessments of brand value developed,
188
 companies asserted that 
brands were worth millions of dollars. In one case, a company asserted 
that a brand accounted for close to twenty percent of a company’s 
value.
189
 Furthermore, from the late 1980s onwards, “intangible 
                                                                                                                     
 184. Cf. Calboli, Sunset, supra note 168, at 381 & n.235 (citing and quoting Nat’l Football 
League Props., Inc. v. Consumer Enters., Inc., 327 N.E.2d 242, 246 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975) (“[T]he 
buying public has come to associate the trademark with the sponsorship of the NFL or of the 
particular member team involved.”)). 
 185. See, e.g., Dogan & Lemley, supra note 169, at 471–72 (“[T]he mark in these cases is 
rarely serving the traditional function of a trademark. Rather than indicating something to the 
consumer about the source . . . of a product, the mark is the product . . . .”). The U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently undercut the first sale doctrine by holding that the sale of 
new products bearing an authorized VW or Audi chrome insignia to fans of the automakers 
causes post-sale confusion and is an infringing use. See Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen 
of Am., Inc., 457 F.3d 1062, 1075–78 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 186. See Calboli, Sunset, supra note 168, at 377–89 (documenting shift in quality control 
standards as business practices changed and arguing that courts have de facto ended any 
substantive quality control rules). 
 187. Cf. KOTLER, supra note 143, at 404 (“Perhaps the most distinctive skill of professional 
marketers is their ability to create, maintain, protect, and enhance brands.”).  
 188. Methods of brand valuation continue to be debated but the fact remains that brands 
account for some and a growing proportion of a company’s overall valuation. See LURY, supra 
note 45, at 120 (examining the growth of the brand as an asset and how some British companies, 
along with the London Stock Exchange, accept brand valuation while U.S. companies do not).  
 189. SUSAN STRASSER, SATISFACTION GUARANTEED: THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN MASS 
MARKET 47 (1989) (noting that in the 1920s, American Tobacco Company was claimed to have 
had a total value of $227 million, with $45 million of that value coming from its trademarks, 
and that National Biscuit Company’s Uneeda brand was worth an alleged $1 million, and Coca-
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assets—usually in the form of brand names—represent[ed] the larger 
share” of a company’s overall value.190  
The corporate dimension of the brand taxonomy offers a better way 
to understand why trademark law embraced the idea of goodwill, 
relaxed the goodwill assignment doctrine such that that rule is now 
essentially meaningless and an exercise in “sterile formalism,”191 and 
took such a permissive stance towards trademark licensing. Trademark 
law continues to face business realities that see the brand as valuable in 
and of itself and as a way to engage in a range of business activities. 
The idea that a company will offer only one or perhaps a series of 
related products is antiquated. Companies not only enter unrelated 
product markets, but consumers have become inured to the idea that a 
company may do so via brand extensions and mark licensing. In 
addition, once the business world viewed the brand as a key, if not the 
dominant, corporate asset, it is not surprising that the business world 
would want the ability to trade that asset. Trademark law has stretched 
the boundaries of the meaning of quality control and goodwill to 
accommodate these practices. It has done so at the cost of fealty to the 
consumer protection and search cost rationales of trademark doctrine. 
C.  Family or House Marks as Brand Extension 
The recognition of family or house marks presents another example 
of brand logic in trademark law. Trademark law explicitly claims that 
marks for a company name or trade name alone—a mark that does not 
identify a product—are not suitable for federal registration.192 Yet 
trademark recognizes the idea of a house mark, such that SONY can 
                                                                                                                     
Cola alleged $5 million for its brand); accord Douglas A. Galbi, Communications Policy, Media 
Development, and Convergence (Common Carrier Bureau, Federal Communications 
Commission, 2001), available at http://www.galbithink.org/ media.htm. 
 190. MOOR, supra note 57, at 34; see also KOTLER, supra note 143, at 405 (explaining that 
“brand equity” is often understood as “the price premium the brand commands times the extra 
volume it moves over an average brand”); accord LURY, supra note 45, at 119–20. The value of 
a brand is expressed when a company realizes a net worth greater than its tangible asset value. 
For an extended investigation of the relationship between brand-equity and intangible assets, see 
generally KLAUS JENNEWEIN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT: THE ROLE OF 
TECHNOLOGY-BRANDS IN THE APPROPRIATION OF TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION (2005) 
(presenting a theory of how brand-equity and technology assets interact to allow companies to 
extract value from initial technological investments).  
 191. See Calboli, supra note 161, at 832 (quoting 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 36, § 18:10) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 192. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 36, § 9:13 (“[A] term used only as a trade name is not 
registerable. For example, a corporate name cannot be registered on the Principal Register 
unless that name is also used in a trademark or service mark sense.”); accord id. § 3:2 
(identifying a trademark’s functions as related to goods); David W. Barnes, One Trademark per 
Source, 18 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 3, 45 (2009). 
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offer SONY WALKMAN and VAIO; APPLE can offer MACINTOSH 
and IPOD; and MCDONALD’S can offer a host of “MC” foods such as 
MCNUGGET, MCRIB, and MCFLURRY.
193
 Under trademark law, a 
house mark “exists only if and when ‘the purchasing public recognizes 
that the common characteristic is indicative of a common origin of the 
goods.’”194 Furthermore, “a house mark serves as an umbrella for all of 
the product marks and merchandise emanating from a single source.”195 
Although the law’s formulation is couched in classic source 
identification language, it fits better within a brand view of 
trademarks.
196
  
The move to an idea of an “umbrella” mark for all products adopts a 
corporate brand view and acknowledge that companies wish to leverage 
a company-level mark to support a range of business activities. As 
discussed above, companies quickly learned to use an existing brand as 
a way to sell new and possibly unrelated products.
197
 Product 
diversification strategies within and into new product lines have 
proliferated since the 1970s.
198
 In some cases, the strategy involves 
using one mark across a range of related and unrelated products. The 
VIRGIN GROUP uses its VIRGIN mark to offer VIRGIN 
MEGASTORE—which sells “CDs, clothing, computer games, books, 
beverages, and travel-related services”—beverages, an airline service, a 
limousine service, and “rail services, balloon services, access to hotel 
properties, bikes, cars, and mobile phones.”199 This example fits into the 
identity approach to branding. 
The identity approach to branding focuses the way in which a 
company can build a monolithic company brand with one coherent, 
centrally controlled identity to drive consumer purchases, rather than 
focusing on single products. These behaviors fall under brand 
diversification or extension strategies. Such strategies “try to satisfy 
[consumers’] desire for ‘something different’ by providing a wide 
variety of goods under a single brand umbrella. Such extensions, 
                                                                                                                     
 193. 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 36, § 7:5. 
 194. AM Gen. Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 311 F.3d 796, 814 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting 
Han Beauty, Inc. v. Alberto-Culver Co., 236 F.3d 1333, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). 
 195. In re Royal BodyCare, Inc., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1564, 1568 (T.T.A.B. 2007). 
 196. Cf. Barnes, supra note 192, at 2 (arguing that trademark law ought to allow only one 
trademark per source, rather than allowing companies to have a rack of trademarks because 
“[m]ultiple marks are not necessary to indicate source”). 
 197. See supra notes 78–80 and accompanying text; accord Katherine E. Halmen, The 
Effects of the Corporate Diversification Trend on Trademarks, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 
459, 467 (2006).  
 198. See Halmen, supra note 197, at 467.  
 199. Id. at 468–70. 
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companies hope, fulfill customers’ desires while keeping them loyal to 
the brand franchise.”200  
Business literature argues that such extensions must be careful not 
to harm the underlying brand and undercut the loyalty of existing 
customers.
201
 But when properly executed, brand extensions allow 
companies to rejuvenate some brands, bring in new customers for the 
company overall, innovate with regard to product lines, block 
competitors, and manage potential competitive threats from new 
products.
202
 Thus, the house mark is the trademark term that maps to 
brand extension strategy. Marketers know that the house mark is the 
corporate brand, that it plays roles well beyond product identification, 
and indeed is important without a product. 
D.  Trade Dress and Branded Packaging 
When trademark law protects trade dress—“the total image of a 
product [which] may include features such as size, shape, color or color 
combinations, texture, graphics, or even particular sales 
techniques”203—it protects a brand understanding of packaging and 
marketing. From a business perspective, the package does not typically 
fulfill a source identification function, but rather it fulfills other 
company brand goals. From a “4 Ps” perspective, trade dress protection 
addresses how companies seek to master the product, place, price, and 
promotion aspects of marketing. 
Trade dress protection originally related, however, to protection for 
a product’s labeling.204 That protection came via unfair competition law, 
                                                                                                                     
 200. John A. Quelch & David Kenny, Extend Profits, Not Product Lines, HARV. BUS. REV., 
Sept.–Oct. 1994, at 153, 154 (emphasis added). 
 201. John A. Quelch & David Kenny, John A. Quelch and David Kenny Respond: 
“Extensions Must Be Carefully Planned and Monitored,” HARV. BUS. REV., Nov.–Dec. 1994, at 
60. 
 202. See David A. Aaker, Perspectives: The Logic of Brand Extensions, HARV. BUS. REV., 
Nov.–Dec. 1994, at 62. 
 203. John H. Harland Co. v. Clark Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 980 (11th Cir. 1983); 
accord Graeme Dinwoodie, Reconceptualizing the Inherent Distinctiveness of Product Design 
Trade Dress, 75 N.C. L. Rev. 471, 484 (1997) (noting the definition and its broad adoption); 
Berzins, supra note 31, at 1664. 
 204. “Trade dress” traditionally includes the appearance of labels, wrappers, and containers 
used in packaging a product as well as displays and other materials used in presenting the 
product to prospective purchasers. The design features of the product itself are also sometimes 
included within the meaning of “trade dress,” although the substantive rules applicable to the 
protection of product designs differ in some respects from those applicable to packaging and 
related subject matter. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 16 cmt. a (1995); 
accord Dinwoodie, supra note 203, at 473; Smith, supra note 147, at 251 (2005) (“Historically, 
trade dress law focused on packaging and labeling, and not the product itself.”). 
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not early trademark law.
205
 Indeed, trade dress protection was probably 
never intended to be part of the Lanham Act.
206
 Nonetheless, trade dress 
began to creep into federal trademark law on par with other registrable 
marks starting “in 1958 when then-Assistant Commissioner Daphne 
Robert Leeds reinterpreted the Trademark Act to allow trade dress's 
registration on the principal register.”207 Others trace the expansion of 
trade dress protection to the 1970s when courts began recognizing and 
protecting trade dress as unregistered marks.
208
 When Congress 
amended the Lanham Act in 1988, courts already recognized trade dress 
as a type of trademark, and the amendments explicitly acknowledged or 
accepted that view by including a discussion of trade dress in the 
statute.
209
 As such, for better or for worse, federal trademark law today 
protects trade dress.
210
  
To understand why trade dress protection may not be desirable, 
recall that trademark law claims to be grounded on the idea that the 
mark identifies source. Trade dress and source pose problems. Professor 
Glynn S. Lunney, Jr. explains that the Restatement (Third) of Unfair 
Competition recognized that trade dress was rarely a source of 
information about the product.
211
 Indeed, the common law “required 
proof that consumers were relying on the claimed trade dress to identify 
a product’s source” and strove to prevent “evidence that the plaintiff 
had made a particular product feature, shape, or configuration popular” 
from being conflated with demand for the product.
212
 Lunney explains: 
With the recognition of trade dress as a trademark, this care 
has largely disappeared. Accepting the pretense that trade 
dress is a trademark, some courts have extended protection 
to dress based upon popularity alone, without requiring any 
                                                                                                                     
 205. See Smith, supra note 147, at 252. 
 206. See generally id. 
 207. Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Trade Dress Emperor’s New Clothes: Why Trade Dress 
Does Not Belong on the Principal Register, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1131, 1133 (2000). 
 208. See Jessica Litman, Note, The Problem of Functional Features: Trade Dress 
Infringement Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 77, 83 (1982); accord 
Dinwoodie, supra note 203, at 478–79; Smith, supra note 147, at 253.  
 209. See Smith, supra note 147, at 253–54 (citing Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, 
Pub. L. No. 100-167, 102 Stat. 3946 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(3) 2006)). But 
see Lunney, supra note 207, at 1185–86 (questioning whether the 1998 amendments to the 
Lanham Act ought to constitute reenactment of the Lanham Act that includes trade dress). 
 210. See John H. Harland Co. v. Clark Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 980 (11th Cir. 1983); 
accord Dinwoodie, supra note 203, at 484 (noting the definition and its broad adoption); 
Berzins, supra note 31, at 1664.  
 211. Lunney, supra note 207, at 1164. 
 212. Id.  
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proof that consumers were relying on the claimed dress to 
identify the product’s source.213 
In short, trade dress often may not serve a source identifying function. If 
trademark law is supposed to protect source identifying functions, why 
does it open the door to protection outside that realm? Lunney’s 
analysis of trade dress points to brands.  
The history of trade dress practices as brand practices tracks the 
law’s growing acceptance of trade dress as a trademark. Companies 
have used labels and packages to build brands since the beginning of 
mass markets.
214
 Packaging provided product information and 
simultaneously served a company’s larger brand project. Companies 
used better labeling and packaging techniques to communicate with 
consumers, but that communication often included or focused on using 
values to encourage buying one company’s product over a competitor’s 
for reasons other than price or quality of the good.
215
 Commercial 
images and standardized packaging—trade dress—allowed for greater 
control over price and distribution, but it also created a sense of 
nationhood and belonging.
216
  
For example, in the early 1900s, companies used trade dress to offer 
newly urban dwellers from rural areas and abroad a sense of connection 
to each other via the branded product.
217
 Recently, that message has 
been inverted, and the brand has become a way to connect isolated 
suburbanites to each other.
218
 In either case, the branded product, 
including the packaging, did more than offer product information; it 
offered a “total image” that the company wished to convey via its brand. 
As Lunney might say, companies’ packages had popularity beyond the 
products. 
Furthermore, whenever companies compete over selling essentially 
the same goods, and therefore must manage excess production capacity, 
                                                                                                                     
 213. Id. 
 214. See KLEIN, supra note 127, at 197; LURY, supra note 45, at 18–19; MOOR, supra note 
57, at 18 (“[I]nnovations in production, printing and packaging made the mass branding of 
goods possible.”); accord Bone, supra note 8, at 577. 
 215. See MOOR, supra note 57, at 18–20; cf. Joachimsthaler & Aaker, supra note 77, at 39 
(“[M]ass-media advertising has long been the cornerstone of most brand-building efforts.”). 
 216. See MOOR, supra note 57, at 20. 
 217. See id. at 21 (explaining that national goods became “the most familiar and stable 
features of a strange and new environment and, in some cases, the only bond between people 
who were otherwise culturally heterogeneous”). 
 218. See Holt, supra note 122, at 82 (explaining that the same stabilizing effect occurred as 
Americans moved from cities to suburbia where they knew no one and looked to brands as 
social anchors). 
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marketing becomes a larger concern.
219
 Product design became a key 
factor in developing and marketing a good because of the need to 
distinguish goods that were quite similar but for their packaging.
220
 By 
the 1960s and 1970s this new emphasis on design became connected to 
the larger aim of creating a brand that projected a singular corporate 
identity—one that integrated design coordination and a more scientific 
approach to marketing.
221
 It is perhaps not coincidental that the two 
moments legal scholarship identifies as most important in the growth of 
trade dress protection—1958 when trade dress could be registered on 
the principal register and the 1970s when trade dress began to be 
protected as an unregistered mark—map to the business practices of 
those times. 
Recent major trade dress cases can also be understood as addressing 
the business realities of competing over essentially interchangeable 
goods and using packing and design to overcome that problem. For 
example, the Supreme Court’s decision in Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco 
Cabana, Inc.
222
 involved a dispute between two Mexican restaurants 
and their respective presentation of the indoor and outdoor dining 
areas.
223
 The Court’s decision in Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products 
Co.
224
 involved a dispute over the use of a specific shade of green on 
dry cleaning presses.
225
 In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros.,
226
 the 
Court addressed a conflict between clothing manufacturers about the 
design of seersucker infant clothing with appliqués.
227
 
Although these cases are mainly understood as delineating the 
requirements for protection of specific types of trade dress,
228
 the 
underlying question is not whether trade dress—be it product packaging 
or product design—can be protected, but rather under what 
                                                                                                                     
 219. See HOLT, supra note 56, at 225 (explaining that the basics of competition are a 
given); KLEIN, supra note 127, at 197; MOOR, supra note 57, at 26–27. 
 220. DANESI, supra note 37, at 60–67 (detailing the importance of product and package 
design through the examples of the automobile, perfume, and tobacco industries); MOOR, supra 
note 57, at 26–27. 
 221. See LURY, supra note 45, at 20–22; MOOR, supra note 57, at 30–31; cf. Moore & Reid, 
supra note 24, at 3 (noting that branding has been a topic in marketing studies prior to the 1970s 
but was only “a major topic of study” from 1970 forward). 
 222. 505 U.S. 763 (1992). 
 223. Id. at 765. 
 224. 514 U.S. 159 (1995). 
 225. Id. at 161. 
 226. 529 U.S. 205 (2000). 
 227. Id. at 207. 
 228. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 147, at 265–75 (analyzing the three cases and the Supreme 
Court’s different approaches to the question of which trade dress type can be inherently 
distinctive and which type requires proof of secondary meaning). 
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circumstances it should be protected.
229
 From a brand perspective, the 
common thread in these cases is that companies compete in markets 
where each company offers essentially the same goods and seeks to use 
trade dress to maintain its position in that type of market. As brand 
scholarship puts it, “the lack of obvious differences between products 
made good appearance a ‘necessity.’”230 Trademark law has been more 
than happy to protect this brand interest. 
E.  Initial Interest and Post-Sale Confusion as Control of Brand Identity 
As source or information issues, initial interest confusion and post-
sale confusion lack justification. But once one takes a corporate brand 
perspective they make sense.
231
 The initial interest confusion doctrine 
tries to prevent the following situation: A consumer is drawn to a 
provider of goods or services because of a name or logo; the consumer 
arrives at the provider’s place of business and quickly realizes that this 
provider is not the one the consumer was seeking; the provider, 
however, offers the same or almost the same goods, and the consumer 
decides that it is best to close the deal with the provider. In such a 
scenario, the consumer is not confused by the time she purchases the 
good, and the doctrine has little to do with rational choice problems that 
traditionally animate trademark law.
232
  
Instead, the doctrine prevents one from diverting potential 
customers’ attention and protects the inchoate idea of goodwill.233 By 
                                                                                                                     
 229. See generally Dinwoodie, supra note 203, at 475 (“The expansion of Lanham Act 
coverage to include product design has severely stretched the capacity of the existing concept of 
distinctiveness to determine the appropriate boundaries of protectable subject matter.”). 
 230. DANESI, supra note 37, at 60–67 (detailing the importance of product and package 
design through the examples of the automobile, perfume, and tobacco industries); MOOR, supra 
note 57, at 26–27 (citing HAROLD LIVINGSTON VAN DOREN, INDUSTRIAL DESIGN: A PRACTICAL 
GUIDE 13 (1940)). Beebe explains that we may be living in a “Diamond Age” where the 
increasing ability persuasively to imitate relative goods (though without 
necessarily imitating their absolute utility) anticipates what social role 
intellectual property law might play in such an environment. For what the 
mimetic technologies discussed above ultimately predict is a kind of post-rarity 
world, perhaps one in which certain material forms of absolute utility remain 
scarce, but persuasive copies of material forms of relative utility become 
superabundant. 
Beebe, supra note 31, at 834–36. 
 231. See Austin, supra note 33, at 853, 896–98, 902–04. 
 232. See generally Jennifer E. Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion: Standing at the 
Crossroads of Trademark Law, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 105 (2005). 
 233. See, e.g., Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1062 
(9th Cir. 1999) (“[B]y using ‘moviebuff.com’ or ‘MovieBuff’ to divert people looking for 
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protecting the reputation and drawing power of a mark, courts enhance 
a company’s ability to pursue a brand strategy that seeks to move 
beyond single-sale, utilitarian relationships to an ongoing one where the 
consumer seeks out the company brand repeatedly regardless of 
product, place, price, or promotion. As one commentator points out, this 
doctrine disfavors comparative advertising, reduces competition, and 
impinges on speech even by a noncompetitor,
234
 all of which aid 
corporate brand goals while diminishing the noncorporate brand 
interests.  
Post-sale confusion protects brands more openly and provides 
another example in which the consumer is not confused and search costs 
are not at stake. In post-sale confusion cases, the consumer knows that 
she bought a knock-off Gucci bag or Rolex watch. The doctrine in part 
holds that the harm lies in others aside from the consumer possibly 
being fooled into thinking that the item was genuine; thus, the doctrine 
attempts to protect the prestige of the mark.
235
 This aspect of the 
doctrine explicitly looks to protecting the status dimensions of a mark. 
In a touchstone case regarding the issue of allowing individuals to make 
and sell facsimiles of an original work, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit explained that the problem lay in allowing someone 
to make the facsimile of the original and sell it so that the consumer 
could “acquir[e] the prestige gained by displaying what many visitors at 
the customers’ homes would regard as a prestigious article.”236 Other 
iterations of the doctrine reveal deeper brand protections. When courts 
hold that the doctrine seeks to prevent the impression that an item is no 
longer scarce, they are protecting a business world that turned to 
branding precisely because of a marketplace where the goods 
themselves were not distinct but instead overabundant.
237
 Companies 
use brands as levers to allow the creation of distinction and scarcity 
where none was present. Post-sale confusion goes directly to that 
interest, as well.
238
 
                                                                                                                     
‘MovieBuff’ to its web site, West Coast improperly benefits from the goodwill that Brookfield 
developed in its mark.”); accord Rothman, supra note 232, at 121 (discussing Brookfield). 
 234. See Rothman, supra note 232, at 130–59.  
 235. See Lunney, supra note 144, at 404–08.  
 236. Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, 
Inc., 221 F.2d 464, 466 (2d Cir. 1955). 
 237. See Beebe, supra note 31, at 851–55 (tracing various forms of the doctrine as 
protecting status and consumption behaviors rather than confusion over source). 
 238. See Austin, supra note 33, at 902 (“The value that consumers accord to prestige 
brands is enormously important to firms, as it enables them to charge premium prices for goods 
well above their marginal cost. The post-sale impression of goods may be critical to a brand’s 
success.” (footnote omitted)). 
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F.  Dilution: Open Protection for Brands 
The dilution doctrine may be the clearest example of how trademark 
law is well-explained from a corporate brand perspective. The essence 
of a dilution claim is that holders of famous marks can sue junior users 
“regardless of the presence or absence of actual or likely confusion, of 
competition, or of actual economic injury.”239 Dilution law is thus not 
concerned with consumers’ search costs. Instead, it is rooted in 
Schechter’s argument that trademark law should protect “the creation 
and retention of custom, rather than the designation of 
source . . . and . . . the preservation of the uniqueness or individuality of 
the trademark [because that] is of paramount importance to its 
owner.”240 Furthermore, “dilution law is producer-focused rather than 
consumer-focused: It seeks to prevent diminution in the value of a 
famous mark stemming from the use of the mark by someone other than 
the trademark [h]older.”241 
From its inception, the doctrine has been subject to intense scrutiny 
in legal academia.
242
 Professor Clarissa Long captures the range of 
criticisms by legal scholars: 
Ever since the creation of federal dilution law, legal 
commentators have expressed consternation about this 
variation of the trademark entitlement. Dilution law has 
been called “absolute and unlimitable,” “powerful,” and 
“immensely popular.” Commentators have labeled dilution 
law “a fundamental shift in the nature of trademark 
protection,” concluded that “plaintiffs frequently win” their 
dilution claims, and wondered whether the statute will 
prove to be a “disaster.” Some commentators are concerned 
that dilution law represents an expansion in property rights 
at the expense of the public domain. Others worry that it 
stifles expression, hampers commercial communication, or 
                                                                                                                     
 239. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006). Federal dilution law has been revised since its initial 
passage in 1995. The original federal statute for dilution simply stated that the holder of a 
famous mark may bring a claim for dilution, but could only obtain an injunction against the 
junior user of the mark if that use “causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark.” 15 
U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (1995). Under the revised federal statute a claim may still only be brought 
by the holder of a famous mark, but now the junior user’s use must be “likely to cause dilution 
by blurring or dilution by tarnishment of the famous mark” for there to be a remedy under the 
cause of action. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006). 
 240. SCHECHTER, supra note 23, at 822 (emphasis omitted). 
 241. Clarissa Long, Dilution, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1029, 1034 (2006); accord Moseley v. V 
Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 429 (2003) (noting that dilution law is aimed at protecting 
producers not consumers). 
 242. See, e.g., Long, supra note 241, at 1029–30; Nelson, supra note 52, at 732. 
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reduces competition. Richard Posner frets about dilution’s 
“seductive appeal.”243 
From a traditional search cost and information view, these criticisms 
have much force.
244
 They also assume that trademark law is in fact 
driven by these normative lodestars.  
The reality is that dilution law abandons these foundations, and 
trademark law in general has been engaged with concerns well beyond 
search costs and information for decades. When Congress explained the 
Federal Trademark Dilution Act as protecting “the substantial 
investment the owner has made in the mark and the commercial value 
and aura of the mark itself,”245 it implicitly took a corporate brand view 
of trademarks.
246
 Providing legal recourse based on a company’s 
“investment in the mark” and its construction of a mark’s “aura” fits 
directly into the way the corporate dimension of brands operates.  
Such perspectives acknowledge that companies seek to construct a 
mark with an identity and personality—traits that offer much more than 
information to the consumer. Criticisms that dilution is far removed 
from trademark law’s search cost and consumer-focused foundations 
are accurate, but they miss the point that trademark law has already 
imported a corporate brand perspective into its doctrine. Dilution can be 
seen as merely the most obvious iteration of that view. 
                                                                                                                     
 243. Long, supra note 241, at 1030 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Beebe, supra note 11, at 
684; Gerard N. Magliocca, From Ashes to Fire: Trademark and Copyright in Transition, 82 
N.C. L. REV. 1009, 1033 (2004); David S. Welkowitz, The Supreme Court and Trademark Law 
in the New Millennium, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1659, 1681 (2004); Mark A. Lemley, The 
Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1698 (1999); David 
J. Franklyn, Debunking Dilution Doctrine: Toward a Coherent Theory of the Anti-Free-Rider 
Principle in American Trademark Law, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 117, 118 (2004); Wendy J. Gordon, 
Introduction, Symposium, Ralph Sharp Brown, Intellectual Property, and the Public Interest, 
108 YALE L.J. 1611, 1614–15 (1999); Richard A. Posner, Misappropriation: A Dirge, 40 HOUS. 
L. REV. 621, 623 (2003)). 
 244. But see Barton Beebe, The Continuing Debacle of U.S. Antidilution Law: Evidence 
from the First Year of Trademark Dilution Revision Act Case Law, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER 
& HIGH TECH. L.J. 449 (2008) (showing that the revised law also seems to add little power to 
trademark enforcement); Long, supra note 241, at 1031 (arguing that doctrine has added little to 
enforcement power of trademark holders); Lunney, supra note 144, at 408–10 (“[Dilution] was 
often tacked onto the court’s opinion as little more than an afterthought.”); see also LURY, supra 
note 45, at 109 (noting the growth of dilution doctrine in the United Kingdom and the shift from 
confusion to more expansive protection against all uses of a mark). 
 245. H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030. 
 246. But see Lunney, supra note 144, at 475–76 (arguing that the Federal Trademark 
Dilution Act of 1995 imported source confusion and “does not reflect a purely property-based 
view of trademarks”). 
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III.  BRAND FAILURES IN TRADEMARK LAW 
At its core, trademark law only has room for source confusion. 
Although trademark law purports to be consumer-focused and 
protecting, the concept of the consumer in trademark law is inconsistent 
and incomplete. Questions about whether someone uses a mark in ways 
beyond source confusion are quickly forced back into analyses that do 
not capture how the mark functions for the consumer. In other words, 
trademark law fails to accommodate the consumer dimension of a 
brand. The way the law addresses the possibility of community marks 
further illustrates these problems and provides an opportunity to see the 
shortcomings of the likelihood of confusion test, which is the 
touchstone test for determining trademark infringement. 
A.  Trademark Law’s Erroneous View of Consumers and Communities 
Trademark law’s view of the consumer is paradoxical if not 
disingenuous. Mired in the world of the fully rational consumer, 
trademark law claims that trademarks are information resources for the 
consumer to use as part of the purchasing process. Whether this rational 
creature exists is questionable, and empirical work to support the view 
is missing.
247
 Regardless, when it comes to issues of infringement and 
protecting the consumer, this highly rational consumer morphs into a 
dullard who must not be asked to use any extra thought to discern what 
a mark may signify.
248
  
As Professor Graeme W. Austin offers, “[T]rademark law often 
seems to be premised on the idea that consumers are mesmerized by 
brands and are incapable of very much independent thought. . . . The 
law assumes that the ordinarily prudent consumer unthinkingly accepts 
the messages trademark proprietors seek to enforce through their 
branding strategies.”249 In other words, when the law abandons the 
rational consumer model, it inserts a view that is not only suspect but 
rejects what brand literature acknowledges: consumers are rather savvy 
                                                                                                                     
 247. Austin, supra note 33, at 866–71 (examining trademark law’s “inchoate empiricism”); 
Barton Beebe, Search and Persuasion in Trademark Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2020, 2022–25 
(2005) (identifying the law’s idealized view of the consumer as “impossibly utilitarian” and the 
debate around the capacities of consumers to think for themselves). 
 248. Austin, supra note 33, at 887–88 (“Some strands of case law, particularly from the 
early decades of the twentieth century, emphasized that ‘the public must be credited with a 
minimum capacity for discrimination.’ More recently, however, ordinarily prudent consumers 
have also been characterized as ‘credulous,’ ‘inexperienced,’ and ‘gullible.’” (footnote omitted) 
(quoting Hiram Walker & Sons, Inc. v. Penn-Maryland Corp., 79 F.2d 836, 839 (2d Cir. 1935), 
J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 4 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23:93 (4th 
ed. 1996), and Stork Rest., Inc. v. Sahati, 166 F.2d 348, 359 (9th Cir. 1948))); Beebe, supra note 
247, at 2023–24. 
 249. Austin, supra note 33, at 829 (footnote omitted). 
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about brands, to the point where they take brands and imbue them with 
personal meanings. Insofar as the law adheres to a behavioral model, in 
which the company pushes the psychological buttons of the consumer 
who is shaped by the message and helpless to resist that message, the 
law adheres to a view that business practice has questioned and in some 
cases rejected this model, as the full ownership of the consumer is 
discredited in consumer brand theory.
250
 This view still suggests, 
however, that trademark law sees its role as understanding and 
protecting consumers. 
Ironically, trademark law’s role has been to use consumers as a 
lever in prying trademark law away from consumer protection towards 
brand protection. Professor Barton Beebe’s work provides insight about 
how two such contradictory views of the consumer—highly rational or 
inane—fed this shift and points to brands as I have described them. In a 
trademark lawsuit, one will characterize consumers depending on 
whether one wants a broad or narrow scope of trademark protection. On 
the one hand, a sophisticated, informed consumer is less likely to be 
confused and so the scope of protection for the trademark would be 
commensurately less. One is not confused when one can discern 
between two marks. On the other hand, an unsophisticated, less 
informed consumer militates in favor of greater trademark protection.
251
 
But as Beebe explains, these extremes miss an important aspect of 
trademarks: their power to persuade. When one follows Beebe’s lead 
and parses trademarks as having the capacity for raising or lowering 
search or information costs as well as the capacity for persuading 
consumers to buy a good, one enters a world of brands.  
According to Beebe, mark holders choose to “assume the costs of 
search in order to gain the benefits of persuasion.”252 That is, producers 
will invest in reducing consumers’ search costs by increasing the 
distinctiveness of their marks as compared to others by “bring[ing] ever 
more information to the marketplace, inside of which is persuasion.”253 
Persuasion is not, however, about utility information such as price or 
function; rather it is about creating a mark that offers differentiation and 
distinction such that a consumer will buy the marked good for the sake 
of the mark.
254
  
This shift to protecting producer’s persuasion interest explains why 
Austin can assert that “important aspects of trademark doctrine render 
consumer thought largely irrelevant to liability theories” and that “[i]n 
                                                                                                                     
 250. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 251. Beebe, supra note 247, at 2035, 2038.  
 252. Id. at 2066. 
 253. Id. at 2068. 
 254. Id. at 2044. 
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much trademark law, legally cognizable harm equates with damage that 
rival traders might do to the ‘branded’ consumer worldview.”255 
Trademark law feeds brand protection, not consumer protection. As 
Beebe explains, “The consumer, once sovereign, has been deposed, 
deprivileged, decentered.”256 In the consumer’s place is a system that 
looks to marks as marks, and its “goal . . . is to enhance the power of the 
[brand] system.”257  
The fair use doctrine in trademark law provides another perspective 
on trademark law’s inability to handle the consumer dimension of 
brands. In the abstract, expressive use of a trademark is not actionable 
by the trademark holder. Yet what is an expressive use of a mark and 
what constitutes fair use is an unclear and unstable area of trademark 
law.
258
 Furthermore, although some trademark theory has tried to 
explain that marks serve multiple roles and are rarely purely source-
identifying,
259
 the dominant view of trademark law as being a private 
good
260
 fully under the control of the mark holder has led to dubious 
litigation tactics by mark holders.
261
 Individual uses of marks—such as 
Barbie in artistic contexts,
262
 Lego on fan sites,
263
 and in almost any 
                                                                                                                     
 255. Austin, supra note 33, at 829. 
 256. Beebe, supra note 247, at 2072. 
 257. Id. 
 258. See generally William McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOWA L. REV. 
49 (2008) (arguing that should a case reach a court free speech concerns usually prevent the 
plaintiff from recovery but that ambiguous trademark “fair use” doctrines generate litigation and 
chill speech). 
 259. See, e.g., Beebe, supra note 11, at 625; Desai & Rierson, supra note 134, at 1802–03; 
Ralph H. Folsom & Larry L. Teply, Trademarked Generic Words, 89 YALE L.J. 1323, 1340 
(1980); Sonia K. Katyal, Trademark Intersectionality, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1601, 1605–06 (2010). 
 260. See David W. Barnes, A New Economics of Trademarks, 5 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. 
PROP. 22, 23–24, 50–57 (2006), http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njtip/vol5/ 
iss1/2 (exploring the tension between private and public goods conceptions of trademark). 
 261. K.J. Greene, Abusive Trademark Litigation and the Incredible Shrinking Confusion 
Doctrine—Trademark Abuse in the Context of Entertainment Media and Cyberspace, 27 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 609, 612–14 (2004); Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and 
Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1064 (2005). 
 262. In artistic contexts, expressive uses entail incorporating a trademark into a painting, 
sculpture, etc. These uses fall under a different yet related issue of the incorporation of a 
trademark into art, and focus on whether a given use is protected under First Amendment 
principles. See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 807 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(artistic works incorporating and transforming Mattel’s Barbie doll constituted parodic speech 
protected by the First Amendment).  
 263. See, e.g., Desai & Rierson, supra note 134, at 1840–41 (describing the Lego 
Corporation’s response to the www.ratemylego.com fan site). 
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non-commercial context—are supposed to be permitted but have been 
suppressed by aggressive mark enforcement.
264
  
As a result, those who wish to use a mark with a good degree of 
certainty face great uncertainty regarding whether a given use is 
permitted.
265
 And if one is sued, the precise nature of which uses are at 
issue and actionable varies from case to case, circuit to circuit, and one 
part of trademark law to another.
266
 Furthermore, by focusing on free 
speech and expressive uses, the law becomes entangled in questions of 
what qualifies as speech and what speech is protected. This approach 
also lacks space for what brand management literature acknowledges 
and exploits: people use brands in ways that are beyond source 
identification and beyond legal conceptions of speech. At the individual 
level, brands become part of how someone creates who they are and 
represents that self to the world.  
Community dimensions of brands fare no better under trademark 
law than consumer dimensions and are possibly in worse shape.
267
 By 
their nature, community brand situations involve a group of consumer 
enthusiasts who take it upon themselves to define the brand.
268
 This 
group may engage in one or more activities, including building Web 
sites, holding meetings, writing polemics, creating artwork, and 
producing branded merchandise.
269
 The mark in question will be 
prominently displayed, discussed, and distributed. In many cases the 
mark will appear as or near how it was originally displayed precisely 
because of the power of that context. Trademark law, however, asks 
whether these acts are likely to cause confusion, and the nature of the 
test for that question does not provide room for this sort of community 
action.
270
 
                                                                                                                     
 264. See, e.g., DAVID BOLLIER, BRAND NAME BULLIES: THE QUEST TO OWN AND CONTROL 
CULTURE (2005) (detailing numerous over-enforcement actions by trademark holders who seek 
to trademark and control “public life”). 
 265. See McGeveran, supra note 258, at 61–64, 66–68; cf. Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. 
Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 285–87 (2007) (noting that even the structure of 
copyright law, which allows for non-rightholder uses, poses difficulties in determining what 
uses are permitted). 
 266. For an excellent analysis of the ways in which expressive use is supposed to work 
compared to how it operates in practice, see generally McGeveran, supra note 258. 
 267. The term “community” as used in this Article should not be taken as an interpretation 
or application of the European Community Trade Mark, which allows one to secure “trademark 
rights throughout the European Union.” Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Trademarks and Territory: 
Detaching Trademark Law from the Nation-State, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 885, 946 (2004) (citing 
Council Regulation No. 40/94, 1994 O.J. (L 11) 3 (EC)).  
 268. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 269. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 270. See McGeveran, supra note 258, at 66, 69 (noting the structural problems inherent in 
the test). 
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Likelihood of confusion is a multifactor test. Courts examine a set 
of factors that vary from circuit to circuit to determine whether a 
particular way a non-mark holder offers the mark is likely to cause 
confusion.
271
 The test seems simple enough, but a short analysis of how 
each factor would be read for community brands shows the test’s 
inadequacy for community brands.
272
 
Assume that a community brand group has formed for NIKE. The 
group has a Web site, holds meetings, attends Nike-sponsored events, 
and produces T-shirts for members of the group. The community’s use 
of NIKE involves a strong mark—a mark that consumers know and 
identify with Nike, the company.
273
 That fact weighs against allowing 
the community mark’s continued use. Given that communities engage 
with a brand by copying them exactly or by offering a close 
interpretation of a brand, courts will easily find that a community 
mark’s version of the mark is similar to the corporation’s mark. That 
similarity is often the point of the community brand. Another factor is 
proximity of goods. The community group offers merchandise to 
celebrate the community’s connection to the brand. The merchandise 
will likely have the NIKE SWOOSH on the shirt. It may or may not 
                                                                                                                     
 271. Cf. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark 
Infringement, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1581, 1600 (2006) (demonstrating that the variances across 
circuits is broad and that courts often rely on a few, select factors and then “stampede” the other 
factors to reach desired results). See generally 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 36, §§ 24:29–:43 
(listing the multifactor test across all circuit courts). 
 272. Despite the differences across circuits, for simplicity’s sake and to emulate analysis 
from a circuit that has a large number of trademark cases, I use the Ninth Circuit’s formulation 
of the test here. The factors examined include (1) the “strength of the mark;” (2) “proximity [or 
relatedness] of the goods;” (3) the “similarity of the marks;” (4) “evidence of actual confusion;” 
(5) the “marketing channels used;” (6) the degree of care customers are likely to exercise in 
purchasing the goods; (7) the “defendant’s intent in selecting the mark;” and (8) “the likelihood 
of expansion” into other markets. AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348–49 (9th Cir. 
1979). Note that Beebe’s study shows that “the similarity of the marks, the proximity of the 
goods, evidence of actual confusion, and the strength of the plaintiff’s mark” are common to all 
the circuits and that intent is common to all except the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit. See Beebe, supra note 271, at 1589–90. 
 273. Strength of mark is a nuanced aspect of trademark law. As McCarthy explains,  
[T]he more distinctive, unique and well-known the mark, the deeper is the 
impression it creates upon the public’s consciousness and the greater the scope 
of protection to which it is entitled. The legal strength of a mark is usually the 
same as its economic and marketing strength. A term which has achieved 
widespread customer recognition as a symbol of origin is more likely to result 
in confusion because of a junior user’s similar mark on similar goods than a 
mark that few customers know of or recognize. 
2 MCCARTHY, supra note 36, § 11:73 (footnotes omitted). Of course, one might argue that if a 
mark is strong enough, consumers may not be confused at all. 
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have the group’s name on it. A loyal group may imitate a NIKE shirt 
such as the famous Jordan soaring silhouette but tweak the company 
version by adding something that indicates the group’s interpretation of 
the brand. Some may go so far as to create Nike zombies or oddball 
merchandise, such as a pillow in the shape of the Air Jordan shoe.
274
 If 
Nike sells merchandise at fairs or fan meetings, and the community 
does so as well, a court may find that the goods are in close proximity. 
Evidence of actual confusion is considered the best evidence of 
likelihood of confusion,
275
 but that assumption leaves little room for 
community uses of the mark. A few examples of actual confusion, such 
as less than ten emails or shoppers claiming actual confusion, will 
suffice.
276
 Courts have found evidence of actual confusion to be highly 
persuasive and tend to prevent such further use.
277
 In our example, the 
community group tries to stay true to its view of the core NIKE image. 
In theory, a mainstream user could encounter the community group 
brand and think that it was really from Nike. The very nature of the 
community group’s approach and the low threshold for what constitutes 
the best evidence of the likelihood of confusion combine so that in 
almost all cases, the community brand will be deemed to cause actual 
confusion. But that conclusion misapprehends the point of the 
community brand. Community brands take the view that the 
community, rather than the corporation, may be or is the true custodian 
of the brand’s reputation. Community brand groups often claim to be  
official purveyors of the brand’s history and meaning.278 As such, a 
community group can often be quite precise about how the company 
presents its brand imagery and message while still questioning and 
deviating from a company’s latest idea of what the brand is.279  
Asking whether marketing channels are likely to converge is also 
the wrong question. Insofar as the community group is selling some 
merchandise at NIKE-themed events or online, a court could find this 
factor increases the likelihood of confusion. But the community group is 
not really marketing its goods to compete with the corporation. As 
noted under the actual confusion factor, the community group is a bit 
different than other consumers. Courts tend to assume that relatively 
                                                                                                                     
 274.  See Nike Air Jordan 1 Sneaker Pillow, ETSY, http://www.etsy.com/listing/ 
88144144/nike-air-jordan-1-sneaker-pillow. I thank Professor Justin Hughes for asking about 
brand practices that are closer to practices found in fan-fiction. 
 275. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 36, § 23:13. 
 276. Id.  
 277. Id.  
 278. See, e.g., HOLT, supra note 56, at 155–56, 184–87 (describing Harley-Davidson 
community activists); Muniz & O’Guinn, supra note 100, at 427 (detailing SAAB community 
behaviors).  
 279. See HOLT, supra note 56, at 155–56, 184–87. 
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common goods are bought without much care.
280
 A court could find that 
most consumers will not exercise much care as they purchase workout 
shirts or posters or visit Web sites about a company.
281
 The brand 
community, however, is not confused about the nature of the 
merchandise. Given the devotion of a brand community, the community 
would instead be quite aware of the differences among the offerings. 
Examining a defendant’s intent is another misplaced inquiry when 
considering community marks. Discerning intent is difficult and 
requires a fact inquiry.
282
 Nonetheless, courts often infer intent to 
infringe from the mere presence of a brand or ask whether the defendant 
took steps to dispel confusion.
283
 This distinction presents an ambiguity 
that would cut against community groups, as they might indicate they 
are not part of Nike the company, but proclaim they are the true keeper 
of the NIKE brand. A Nike community group would intend that it has 
an “affiliation, connection, or association” with NIKE the brand, but the 
group would not necessarily intend that Nike was “the origin, 
sponsorship, or approval of [the group’s] goods, services, or 
commercial activities.”284 
Finally, although a community group may sell merchandise, it is not 
really in the market that the corporation is in. Nonetheless, the group 
may be seen to be in a market which the company may enter, and the 
market entry factor would weigh against the community group. In our 
example, Nike may want to expand into the fan sector. Indeed, given the 
company’s brand goal of creating a loyal, fan-based brand, such a move 
may be likely. The community group’s presence could be seen as either 
                                                                                                                     
 280. Cf. Virgin Enters. v. Nawab, 335 F.3d 141, 151 (2d Cir. 2003) (explaining that 
professional buyers have a higher standard of care than common retail consumers). 
 281. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 36, § 23:93 (“The law is not made for the protection of 
experts, but for the public—that vast multitude which includes the ignorant, the unthinking and 
the credulous, who, in making purchases, do not stop to analyze, but are governed by 
appearance and general impressions.” (quoting Florence Mfg. Co. v. J. C. Dowd & Co., 178 F. 
73, 75 (2d Cir. 1910)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 282. McGeveran, supra note 258, at 96–97. In theory, one could intend to confuse, fail to 
do so, and arguably not be liable for infringement. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 22 cmt. b (1995) (“[P]roof of an intent to deceive is not required . . . .”). But cf. 
Rebecca Tushnet, Trademark Law as Commercial Speech Regulation, 58 S.C. L. REV. 737, 
754–55 (2007) (suggesting that trademark law departs from other legal speech restrictions in its 
lack-of-intent-requirements). 
 283. McGeveran, supra note 258, at 96 (“Not surprisingly, courts often deny summary 
judgment for defendants because questions of fact remain concerning this vague and possibly 
intent-based third factor. For example, the Ninth Circuit has found the mere presence of a 
celebrity’s likeness or trademark created enough possibility of implied endorsement to foreclose 
summary judgment.” (footnote omitted) (citing Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 
994, 1009 (9th Cir. 2001), and Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 412–13 (9th 
Cir. 1996))). 
 284. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2006). 
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impeding the company’s ability to do so or somehow as competing with 
the company for the fan support market. Neither of these views reflects 
what a community group does with merchandise. 
Perhaps most damning is that the above analysis affords courts the 
presumption that they weight each factor equally in applying the test. 
Empirical work by Beebe shows, however, that is not the case.
285
 
Instead, it appears that if courts find intent and actual confusion, they 
are likely to “stampede” the rest of the analysis to conform to the 
outcome, especially when that outcome favors finding confusion.
286
 
Given the way in which communities use marks, the chance is high that 
a court would find that such uses cause actual confusion and were 
animated by an intent to infringe the mark. These two conclusions 
would lead to a finding of infringement regardless of the propriety of 
such a ruling. Even if one dismisses Beebe’s findings, for almost any 
brand, the design of the likelihood of confusion test does not 
accommodate the community brand perspective.
287
 Instead, each factor 
champions a one-way, corporate control model of trademarks. Any 
slightly ambiguous aspect of the analysis tilts in favor of the mark 
holder. Much like individuals and consumer marks, groups who use 
community brands do not fit well into trademarks law’s view of how 
trademarks function. 
B.  Brands as Information Resources that Enable the Co-Creation of Value 
The search cost theory of trademarks not only has run amok, it no 
longer maps to the way in which information and value creation 
interact. As a normative matter, a brand theory of trademark embraces 
the shift to a co-creation of value model. In addition, it reorients and 
revives the role of trademarks as true information resources, not simply 
one-way tools controlled by corporations. 
Trademark law in essence invokes consumers as it vaunts producer 
interests. Even if one concedes that trademark law’s formula for 
protecting consumer interests is viable as an abstract matter, one must 
address a problem. As Professor Douglas A. Kysar explains, because 
consumers are “express[ing] public values through a market medium 
that is being endorsed simultaneously as a primary locus of choice, 
opportunity, and responsibility, individuals may well come to view such 
preferences as their most appropriate mechanism for influencing the 
                                                                                                                     
 285. See Beebe, supra note 271, at 1620. 
 286. Id. at 1614–15. 
 287. Cf. McGeveran, supra note 258, at 76 (“[M]arching one-by-one through the ill-fitting 
factors of the likelihood of confusion test is a terrible methodology for resolving expressive use 
cases.”). 
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policies and conditions of a globalized world.”288 This dynamic raises a 
vital issue: “[I]f private market behavior is to serve the expansive 
evaluative function that proponents of the liberal market vision have 
proposed for it, then consumers should receive an informational context 
that is appropriately robust for the role they are being asked to serve.”289  
Trademarks arguably provide some of the required information, but 
they are not “appropriately robust.” Trademark law’s current structure 
vindicates the corporate control aspects of information flow and often 
serves as a tool to squash the noncorporate aspects. A brand theoretical 
approach to trademarks, however, moves beyond tenuous reliance on 
producers to care for consumers’ interests. It provides a way to ensure 
that all sides of the market, consumers and producers, receive an 
“appropriately robust” “informational context.”290 
Corporations, consumers, and communities all play large roles in 
providing information about a brand.
291
 Corporations use radio, 
television, and the Internet to offer brand information. At the same time, 
using sophisticated, yet practically ubiquitous, information tools, 
activists have platforms from which they can both question and laud a 
company’s business practices. Brand activists put corporate practices 
related to brand image and identity—such as labor, sustainability, the 
environment, health, and more—front and center, and in ways not 
previously possible.
292
 This information is obviously useful to 
consumers and communities who wish to make better-informed 
purchasing decisions.
293
 What is perhaps less obvious is that both 
                                                                                                                     
 288. Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product Distinction and 
the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 525, 535 (2004). 
 289. Id. 
 290. See id.; cf. Litman, supra note 9, at 1731–32 (noting how protecting the persuasive 
aspects of trademarks hinders competition and the differences in information offered as 
purchasers decide what to buy). 
 291. One commentator argues that it is precisely the most ardent of consumers to whom a 
company must pay attention, for so-called super-consumers, who are about 10% of a market, 
can account for 50% of profits. See Eddie Yoon, Tap into Your Super-Consumers, HARV. BUS. 
REV. BLOG (Nov. 25, 2009, 8:39 AM), http://blogs.hbr.org/cs/2009/11/surprising_insights 
_from_super.html. 
 292. See Kysar, supra note 288, at 529, 641 (“Globalization . . . has enhanced the flow of 
information, not merely goods, and information regarding processes increasingly is finding its 
way downstream[, and c]onsumers are responding accordingly[:] . . . consumer preferences may 
be heavily influenced by information regarding the manner in which goods are produced.”); cf. 
Isabelle Maignan & O.C. Ferrell, Corporate Social Responsibility and Marketing: An 
Integrative Framework, 32 J. ACAD. MARKETING SCI. 3, 6–7 (2004). 
 293. See generally Margaret Chon, Marks of Rectitude, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2311 (2009) 
(decoding trademarks and certification marks in order to enable consumers to make sound 
purchasing decisions); Kysar, supra note 288, at 527–29 (distinguishing between product-
related information as it applies to potential hazards to users versus actual hazards to workers, 
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positive and negative information is not only useful, but vital to 
companies who wish to remain competitive.  
Although a company taking the corporate control view of brands 
and trademarks may not like the way in which consumers and 
communities interact with and interpret a brand, brand theorists have 
shown that a company can and should use noncorporate-driven 
information and images of the brand to inform and shape brand strategy. 
Holt’s study of brands argues that brands—such as COCA-COLA, 
CORONA, SNAPPLE, MOUNTAIN DEW, VW BEETLE, and 
BUDWEISER—thrive when they pay attention to the noncorporate 
dimensions of brands and “co-author” the brand with consumers and 
communities.
294
 
For example, a case study of the HARLEY-DAVIDSON brand 
shows how companies can use noncorporate market information to 
enhance the brand. Despite being the only American motorcycle 
company after its last domestic rival, Indian, closed in 1953, Harley-
Davidson began losing ground in the 1960s as Japanese competitors 
entered the market.
295
 At that time, management opposed the way in 
which consumers viewed the HARLEY-DAVIDSON brand. Harley-
Davidson rejected the myth—outlaw freedom—that its brand offered 
because it saw that image as antithetical to the suburban touring vehicle 
Harley-Davidson wanted its bikes to be.
296
 In the 1980s, Harley-
Davidson operated from a corporate control perspective and took over 
the independently organized customer groups, as they seemed like a 
great marketing tool. That move upset Harley-Davidson’s core brand 
community.
297
 
Despite these missteps, the culture industry and populist views of 
HARLEY-DAVIDSON generated a brand image that Harley-Davidson, 
the company, was able to tap into when it changed its attitude toward 
the outlaw image and those who embraced that view. The initial 
attempts to ape the way in which the culture saw HARLEY-
DAVIDSON rang false. But as Harley-Davidson became more 
sophisticated in listening to consumers and communities, its marketing 
people were able to draw on the core image and author additional brand 
stories and related images that resonated with the views its loyal 
customers had about Harley-Davidson and the world.
298
 As Holt argues, 
                                                                                                                     
animals, and the environment due to the production of such goods, and how such affect 
consumer purchasing decisions). 
 294. HOLT, supra note 56, passim. 
 295. Id. at 155–56. 
 296. Id. at 186–87. 
 297. Id. at 184. 
 298. Id. at 187. 
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although HARLEY-DAVIDSON addressed some quality issues and 
spent money on advertising, the consumers, the Harley-Davidson 
community, and the culture provided the information required to turn 
Harley-Davidson around and offer a brand that produced long waiting 
lists for motorcycles, which cost $20,000 and often led to spending 
another $5,000 on Harley-Davidson accessories.
299
 
Mattel’s about-face regarding Aqua’s song “Barbie Girl” provides 
another example of how an initial negative reaction among consumers 
can change to acceptance of an alternative review of the brand. Aqua’s 
song mocked BARBIE and much of the negative stereotypes for which 
BARBIE seemed to stand, such as leading a plastic life, being a blonde 
bimbo, and embodying the idea that women are objects to be dressed up 
and manipulated. Mattel sued the record publisher on several grounds, 
including a claim that the song violated trademark law. Mattel lost the 
case in 2002.
300
 By the end of 2009, however, Mattel licensed “Barbie 
Girl,” altered some of the risqué and more critical lyrics, and created the 
doll’s first music video to go with the song.301 
One could plausibly argue that Harley-Davidson, and those who 
follow the lead of consumers and communities, merely co-opt true 
populist culture. Some antibrand activists argue just that point. Yet 
asking whether corporate responses to consumer and community views 
are attempts to co-opt culture is the wrong question. Before 
understanding why it is the wrong question, it is necessary to appreciate 
the effects of brand criticism. 
As discussed above, antibrand movements use brands as a resource 
to express displeasure with a brand and its affiliated corporation. Klein 
documents how Nike, McDonald’s, and Shell faced activists who 
challenged the brands for not living up to standards or failing to meet 
desired standards.
302
 The Nike activists used the Internet, the press, 
protests, and community events to provide high-quality information 
regarding Nike labor practices and the way in which inner city 
markets—a key culture center used in marketing Nike products—were 
driven to pay extremely marked-up prices (in some cases, teens even 
killed one another) to acquire the products.
303
 
                                                                                                                     
 299. Id. at 156. 
 300. See generally Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc, 296 F.3d 894, 899, 908 (9th Cir. 
2002). 
 301. See Stuart Elliot, Years Later, Mattel Embraces ‘Barbie Girl,’ N.Y. TIMES MEDIA 
DECODER (Aug. 26, 2009, 4:30 PM), http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/26/years-
later-mattel-embraces-barbie-girl/; Elva Ramirez, Barbie’s First Music Video Turns the Aqua 
Original on Its Head, WALL ST. J. SPEAKEASY (Aug. 28, 2009, 12:16 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/ 
speakeasy/2009/08/28/barbie-model-astronaut-rock-star-marxist-theorist/.  
 302. See KLEIN, supra note 127, at 365, 379, 387. 
 303. Id. at 366–79. 
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Brand activism highlighted Shell’s operations in Nigeria and how 
the company and some powerful government leaders made large sums 
of money while those residing near the oil drilling sites lived in squalor, 
faced environmental harms from the drilling process, and in some cases 
were killed for protesting the exploitation.
304
 Other Shell brand activism 
stopped the company from sinking a rusty old oil platform in the 
Atlantic Ocean. By sharing information about the cost to a $128 billion 
company of sinking the platform ($16 million) compared to disposing 
of it on land ($70 million), activists managed to generate protests and 
boycotts of Shell stations, which saw drops in business ranging between 
“20 and 50 percent.”305  
In the so-called McLibel case, two environmental activists made 
claims about McDonald’s role in deforestation, developing countries’ 
poverty, animal cruelty practices, harming public health, poor labor 
practices, and advertising that improperly targeted children. 
McDonald’s initially responded with legal action but tried to settle once 
the case started generating negative publicity. The defendants chose not 
to settle, and the 313-day trial continually placed McDonald’s business 
practices in the spotlight.
306
  
These activities do not always lead to results that brand activists 
appear to desire. In some specific cases, such as with Shell and the oil 
platform, behaviors change. Nike’s stock dropped and some thought the 
human rights and labor issues were part of that market trouble.
307
 
McDonald’s and Shell faced continued scrutiny of their business 
practices. Nonetheless, as Klein admits, in other cases problems persist: 
Shell still operates in Nigeria with violence and other harms 
surrounding the operations; Nike has not faced a total boycott and still 
uses low-cost, international labor to make its products; and McDonald’s 
won its case.
308
 
The lesson is not that brand activists will always be able to alter 
corporate behaviors in fundamental ways. Instead, corporations should 
appreciate that the brand is an information vehicle that can signal 
market conditions and interests. Brands are not just important, useful 
information resources for the noncorporate side of brands, but for the 
corporate side, as well. 
                                                                                                                     
 304. Id. at 383–84. 
 305. Id. at 379–80. 
 306. Id. at 387–89. 
 307. Id. at 377–78. 
 308. See McDonald’s Corp. v. Steel & Morris, [1997] EWHC (QB) 366 (Eng.), available 
at http://www.mcspotlight.org/case/trial/verdict/verdict_jud.html; see also McDonald’s Corp. v. 
Steel, [1995] 3 All E.R. 615 (Eng.); Steel & Morris v. United Kingdom, [2005] ECHR 
68416/01; accord KLEIN, supra note 127, at 376–77, 387, 390. 
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Evolving conceptions of the market and how value is created 
challenge core assumptions in trademark theory. Trademark theory and 
doctrine ostensibly rely on a product focus and see all market action as 
firm-driven and controlled. The firm pushes information to the 
consumer and the market. In this view, “[Trademark] law’s core 
mission, as it is understood today, is to facilitate the transmission of 
accurate information to the market.”309 
In contrast, economic theory that looks to the co-creation of value 
posits that instead of a “[o]ne-way,” “[f]irm to consumer,” “[c]ontrolled 
by [the] firm” “[c]onsumer [as] ‘prey’” perspective of markets, a 
“[t]wo-way,” “[c]onsumer to firm,” “[c]onsumer to consumer,” 
“[c]onsumer [who] can ‘hunt’” perspective is the reality of a co-creation 
market.
310
 As Prahalad and Ramaswamy argue: 
Unless we make a shift from a firm-centric to a co-creation 
perspective on value creation, co-extraction of economic 
value by informed, connected, empowered, and active 
communities of consumers on the one hand and cost 
pressures wrought by increased competition, competitive 
discontinuities, and commoditization on the other will only 
make it harder for companies to develop a sustainable 
competitive advantage. The future belongs to those that can 
successfully co-create unique experiences with 
customers.
311
 
Under this view, “Co-creation converts the market into a forum where 
dialogue among the consumer, the firm, consumer communities, and 
networks of firms can take place.”312 In other words, decentralized, two-
way information flow is a key part of co-creation of value. 
A brand theory of trademark incorporates the way in which 
consumers and communities interact with a brand and explicitly takes a 
co-creation view of brands. In this view, brands are two-way, rather 
than one-way, information conduits. This approach abandons the idea 
that a brand or trademark is static. No matter what a company wishes to 
be the meaning of a brand, consumers and communities will interact 
                                                                                                                     
 309. Bone, supra note 8, at 548 (emphasis added).  
 310. Prahalad & Ramaswamy, supra note 118, at 12 tbl.2; cf. Michael Porter & Mark R. 
Kramer, Strategy and Society: The Link Between Competitive Advantage and Corporate Social 
Responsibility, HARV. BUS. REV., Dec. 2006, at 78, 91 (arguing that managers must abandon 
their “ingrained us-versus-them mind-set” so they can generate shared value as part of a 
corporate social responsibility strategy). 
 311. Prahalad & Ramaswamy, supra note 118, at 12. 
 312. Id. at 11–12; cf. Porter & Kramer, supra note 310, at 91 (arguing that because 
“exposure to criticism and liability, and consumers’ attention to social issues are all persistently 
increasing” the opportunities to increase value based on social matters are increasing, as well). 
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with and decide what the brand means to them.
313
 These interactions 
can be either positive or negative. Trying to hem in the noncorporate 
dimensions of brands is futile and in fact has the potential to harm the 
brand, for those dimensions provide valuable information regarding the 
brand.
314
  
Put differently, brands are part of markets. Of great importance to a 
theory addressing trademarks is the way in which brands have become 
agents for social change and ways they affect market behaviors. In some 
cases, noncorporate practices can provide useful information to 
companies, as well as other consumers, about the brand and its related 
product and company. In other cases, noncorporate practices can help a 
company understand whether its view of the brand’s meaning fits its 
audience’s perception.  
A strategy that either responds to and incorporates consumers’ and 
communities’ views or that engages in social responsibility could be a 
way to co-opt critics, a sham, or a public relations move. That 
perspective, however, misses the competitive strategy point: 
The mutual dependence of corporations and society implies 
that both business decisions and social policies must follow 
the principle of shared value. That is, choices must benefit 
both sides. If either a business or a society pursues policies 
that benefit its interests at the expense of the other, it will 
find itself on a dangerous path. A temporary gain to one 
will undermine the long-term prosperity of both.
315
 
A brand’s viability also operates under this type of mutual dependence. 
A healthy, open view of brands with attentive and engaged consumers 
and communities can contribute to a company’s value. Furthermore, as 
the Harley-Davidson and other examples show, it is precisely this 
symbiotic relationship that mitigates the ability of a company to take on 
unauthentic postures; false or thin commitments to a cause or attempts 
to jump on the latest trend are quickly identified and denounced.  
In short, a brand theory of trademark rejects purely centralized 
control as a losing strategy and shows that companies are more likely to 
enhance brand value by paying attention to both positive and negative 
                                                                                                                     
 313. See generally Beebe, supra note 31, at 812; Desai & Rierson, supra note 134, at 1789 
(discussing the dynamic nature of language and the flaws in trying to control a trademark’s 
meaning).  
 314. For example, brands can provide information that helps companies plan which 
strategy to pursue. Cf. Porter & Kramer, supra note 310, at 91–92 (arguing that companies must 
“identify the particular set of societal problems that it is best equipped to help resolve and from 
which it can gain the greatest competitive benefit”). 
 315. Porter & Kramer, supra note 310, at 84. 
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consumer and community interactions with a brand rather than trying to 
snuff them out.
316
 Furthermore, a brand theory of trademarks indicates 
that the core mission of trademarks can and ought to be understood as 
facilitating the transmission of accurate information within and across 
the market, not simply from one side of the market to the other.  
CONCLUSION: A POTENTIAL NEW ORDER FOR TRADEMARK LAW 
Trademark law struggles to remain coherent. It simply is not sure 
how to manage all the interests at stake in the modern business 
environment. This failure flows from a core misunderstanding: 
trademark law has not grasped that legal disputes over trademarks are in 
fact disputes over brands.  
This Article lays the foundation for future work on brands in the 
law. It is not designed to rewrite all of trademark law. Instead, by 
synthesizing brand scholarship, this Article offers a brand theory of 
trademarks. This theory provides clear foundational insights and a 
normative lodestar for future trademark policy and scholarship.  
Law and economics has laid claim as an overarching and coherent 
way to understand trademark law. That claim must be limited to a 
narrow conception of what trademarks, as a subset of brands, do. 
Furthermore, under the law and economics search cost theory of 
trademark law, trademarks play a vital role in providing information to 
the marketplace. Yet, as this Article has shown, trademark law vaunts 
corporate and producer interests in pushing information to consumers 
while undermining the ability for others to participate in the information 
marketplace.  
A brand theoretical approach to trademarks presents a better, more 
functional understanding of what trademark law protects. This approach 
clarifies how trademark law has expanded over the years so that 
doctrines such as anonymous source, confusion, trade dress, family or 
house marks, merchandising rights, assignment in gross, initial interest 
and post-sale confusion, and dilution vindicate business interests in 
controlling brands while shirking the responsibility to manage the full 
range of consumer and community interests.  
As a diagnostic matter, a brand theory of trademarks allows for clear 
identification of what interests are at stake. Each dimension of a 
brand—product, corporate, consumer, and community—is important to 
a well-functioning brand. By parsing corporate and noncorporate 
dimensions of a brand, courts and policymakers can identify what rules 
and metrics ought to apply. In some cases, economic and competition 
rules will be best suited to a problem. Even so, understanding brands 
                                                                                                                     
 316. See supra Part I.C.  
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helps assess the nature of competition and pricing in such contexts.
317
 In 
other cases, individual and community interests may be the concern. In 
those situations, a brand perspective offers a fuller way to understand 
what those interests are and whether they are harmful to a corporate 
mark holder.
318
 A brand theory of trademarks permits one to see the true 
interests at stake in a claim and then decide whether to expand or limit 
trademark law’s reach. 
Moreover, a brand theory of trademark shows that if trademark law 
is to continue to rely on information transmission as its normative 
foundation, trademark law must acknowledge and incorporate the fact 
that in today’s information-driven economy, brands are two-way 
information channels. Modern business theory sees that value as a co-
creative process. In many areas, the corporation provides resources to 
consumers and communities who then interact with the resources to 
create something new.
319
 The open source movement is but one 
example of the insight that “[t]he interaction between the firm and the 
consumer is becoming the locus of value creation and value 
extraction.”320  
In short, the brand understanding of trademarks offered in this 
Article identifies the true nature of a brand: a dynamic information 
device subject to interpretation and reworking by all connected to it. As 
information plays an ever-larger role in our economy, a brand theory of 
trademarks offers the opportunity to bring trademark law into the 
information age. Rather than relying on a limited view of trademarks 
where corporations expend vast resources as they try to control the 
meaning of a mark, corporations would focus on developing and 
protecting brands in competitive contexts while also using the brand to 
help develop future strategies based on market information provided by 
consumers and communities. In addition, this approach would open the 
door to trademark living up to a vision where all sides of the market 
have “an informational context that is appropriately robust”321 for their 
decisions and can truly signal market preferences. 
                                                                                                                     
 317. See generally Desai & Waller, supra note 23. 
 318. Cf. McKenna, supra note 53, at 117 (discussing possible brand-informed views of 
harm within trademark law).  
 319. See supra notes 311–12 and accompanying text. 
 320. Prahalad & Ramaswamy, supra note 118, at 5. 
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